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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Marlin-Rockwell Division of TRW, Inc,
OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance #F79-1

and
UAW

Local 338

The stipulated issue is:
Did a method change as defined in Section
17.3.10 of the contract occur from the
original standards which justified a change
in the standards on the elements involved
on jobs 556-01, 556-03, 556-04, 556-09 and
556-14? If not what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Jamestown, New York on January 9
and August 19, 1980 at which time representatives of the above
named Company and Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Post-

hearing memoranda were filed by the parties.
Section 17.3.10 of the contract reads:
A method change is defined as any change
from the method used when the standard
was established. A method change, such
as in materials, equipment or procedures
justifies the adjustment of the time
standard consistent with such method
changes, but only those elements of the
job affected shall be subject to a change
in standard.
I am persuaded that the evidence adduced by the Company
showing a change from gauging concentricity on both sides to
gauging concentricity on one side, the checking of lug depth
on only one side rather than on both sides, the elimination
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of one of two "sparkouts," the changes in the "pumping lever"
affecting feeds, and other procedural adjustments constituted
"method changes" within the meaning of the foregoing contract
clause.

The Union's case fails to rebut this evidence or this

conclusion.
Therefore without judging the accuracy of the new time
standards, the Company has met the condition precedent to
making changes in the time standards by showing changes in
methods as required by Section 17.3.10 of the contract.

The

Union's grievance is therefore denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Method changes as defined in Section
17.3.10 of the contract did occur from
the original standards which justified
a change in the standards on the elements
involved on jobs 556-01, 556-03, 556-04,
556-09 and 556-14.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 20, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York ) * "
On this 20th day of October, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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and
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The stipulated issue is:
Did a method change as defined in Section
17.3.10 of the contract occur from the
original standards which justified a change
in the standards on the elements involved
on jobs 556-01, 556-03, 556-04, 556-09 and
556-14? If not what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Jamestown, New York on January 9
and August 19, 1980 at which time representatives of the above
named Company and Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
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A method change is defined as any change
from the method used when the standard
was established. A method change, such
as in materials, equipment or procedures
justifies the adjustment of the time
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changes, but only those elements of the
job affected shall be subject to a change
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I am persuaded that the evidence adduced by the Company
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of one of two "sparkouts," the changes in the "pumping lever"
affecting feeds, and other procedural adjustments constituted
"method changes" within the meaning of the foregoing contract
clause.

The Union's case fails to rebut this evidence or this

conclusion.
Therefore without judging the accuracy of the new time
standards, the Company has met the condition precedent to
making changes in the time standards by showing changes in
methods as required by Section 17.3.10 of the contract.

The

Union-s grievance is therefore denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Method changes as defined in Section
17.3.10-of the contract did occur from
the original standards which justified
a change in the standards on the elements
involved on jobs 556-01, 556-03, 556-04,
556-09 and 556-14.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 20, 1980
STATE OF New York )
ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 20th day of October, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE

Local 288,

AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 0824 80

and
Monsanto Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance regarding pay for
death in the family heard at the third
step on March 11, 1980?
The grievance was filed by the Union on behalf of Earle
Mills, et al.

The parties stipulated that disposition of the

grievance in this arbitration shall apply to grievant Mills and
other employees similarly situated.

If the grievance is grant-

ed the Company and Union will decide which other employees are
similarly situated.

If they cannot agree that question shall

be referred back to this Arbitrator for a further hearing and
determination.
A hearing was held in Chicopee, Massachusetts on August 25,
1980 at which time Mr. Mills, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", and representatives of the above named Company and
Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The relevant contract section is Section 19.
part it reads:

In pertinent

-2Section 19. The Company will continue
its present practice of paying regular
straight tine earnings up to a maximum
of three days during absence from duty
of hourly employees when such absence
is caused by a death in the employee's
immediate family. An immediate family
shall be limited to parents, husband,
wife, children, brother, sister, parentsin-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law,
grandparents and grandchildren, sons-inlaw and daughters-in-law, step-parents
and step-children.
Inasmuch as the three days allowable is
a discretionary maximum and not a mandatory amount of time, the employee's working schedule shall be examined for purposes
of determining the actual number of working
days for which payment shall be approved.
The grievant claims three days pay for his absence from
regularly scheduled work days due to the death of his father-inlaw.

The Company granted him two days pay; he seeks one addi-

tional day through this grievance.

It is undisputed that the

father-in-law died on January 4th, 1980; that the grievant
attended the wake on January 6th and the funeral on January 7th.
What is in dispute is whether he shall receive a days pay for
January 5th also.

All three days were days on which the grievant

was scheduled to work.
The Company asserts that under the contract the number of
days off for a death in the immediate family is discretionary,
and is "... up to a maximum of three ...."

The Company contends

that in administering Section 19 it has granted pay for attendance at the funeral, the wake, and for the day if the employee
is personally involved in making funeral arrangements with the
funeral home or director.

(Also within the three days, travel

-3time may be included if the funeral is some distance away.)

In

the instant case the Company points out that the grievant attended the funeral; that there was a wake of only one day and that
therefore under the Company's administrative policy the grievant ' s entitlement to time off with pay was limited to those two
days.

The Company does not consider the grievant's assistance

to his mother-in-law on January 5 (when he provided her with
transportation to and from her home and the funeral home) to
constitute "making arrangements with the funeral director."
The Union contends that the Company has historically and as
a matter of unvaried practice granted three days off with pay
when an employee was otherwise scheduled to work on those days,
in the case of a death in the immediate family covered by Section
19 of the contract.

Uniformly, argues the Union, the Company

has paid for the day on which the affected employee attends the
funeral and for the two days immediately preceding the funeral
if each of the three days, as in the instant case, was a day on
which the employee was scheduled to work.

It asserts that at

no time did the Company place any conditions on what would be
required on those two preceding days so long as in fact a covered
member of the immediate family had died and the affected employe
attended the funeral.

The Union claims that at no time prior to

the instant case were employees required to prove that they
attended the wake or that they were actively engaged in making
funeral arrangements in order to qualify for the two days preceding the funeral.
Two pertinent parts of Section 19 would appear to be in

-4conflict.

One part gives the Company the discretionary author-

ity to determine the number of days to be paid to an employee
otherwise scheduled to work for time off due to death in his
immediate family,

with a maximum of three days allowable.

An-

other part, the Company's discretionary authority notwithstanding, mandates the Company to "continue its present practice"
regarding the payment of time off for absences due to death in
the immediate family.

Fundamental contract interpretation re-

quires that seemingly inconsistent language be reconciled if
possible rather than to interpret one part in a manner which
would nullify another.

Here, though the Company has the discre-

tionary authority to determine its policy regarding payment for
time off under the circumstances present in this case, it is my
judgement that once that policy is unilaterally determined and
implemented by practice, the Company is thereafter contractually
obligated to continue applying that policy and practice.

Based

on the record before me, I conclude that the Company has consistently granted three days pay for time off from otherwise scheduled
duty in the case of death in the immediate family under Section
19 of the contract.

Internally the Company may have established

and implemented that policy and practice based on and at a time
when customarily

two days of wake preceded the funeral.

The

Company explained that when this was the religious practice it
assumed that affected employees were so involved for the three
days and routinely granted three days off with pay.

However the

Company points out that the religious customs and requirements
have changed and that at present only a single day of a wake is
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held preceding the funeral.

The latter situation applies here,

the Company argues and therefore the grievant was entitled only
to the two days (for the wake and the funeral).
It is clear to me that the Company's internal determination
as to how many days off it would grant and what the eligibility
conditions would be, were not previously communicated to the
Union nor was notice thereof otherwise disseminated to the
employees.

So far as the Union and the employees were concerned

three days off, if otherwise scheduled to work, was automatic.
Not having particularized to the Union and the employees the
conditions under which the three days would be granted, I must
conclude that the "present practice" was to grant the full three
days unconditionally, so long as the deceased was within the
class of persons enumerated in Section 19 and the affected employee attended the funeral.

This is not to say that the Company

did not have the discretionary right to grant fewer than three
days, or to require that specific conditions be met in order to
qualify for any or all of the three days, but rather that in
administering Section 19

and as a matter of practice the Company

placed no such conditions or limitations on eligibility by notice to the Union and the employees.

Hence it is bound to the

only practice which the Union and the employees knew and saw,
namely the routine and automatic grant of three days off.
Also, this is not to say that the Company may not exercise
its discretionary authority to promulgate explicit rules and
conditions regarding absences due to death in the family.

The

Company's rights to do so prospectively or to bargain with the

-6Union on that question are reserved.

Rather it is to say that

up to and including the instant grievance, the Company had not
changed its practice or promulgated such rules and regulations
setting forth the conditions under which time off would be grant
ed under Section 19.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of Earle
R. Mills, et al regarding pay for death
in the family heard at the third step on
March 11, 1980 is granted. Mills and
other employees similarly situated shall
be granted a third day of pay due to absence from scheduled work as a result of
a death in the immediate family, as defined in Section 19 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: September 2, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this second day of September, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Committee of Interns and Residents

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0883 79

and
Montefiore Hospital Medical Center
The stipulated issue is:
Was the Hospital's action in not paying
approximately 72 interns and residents
a day's pay on January 17, 1979 when said
employees did not completed scheduled
tours of duties a violation of the contract?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 14, 1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Hospital appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Both sides filed post-hear-

ing briefs.
I find no support in the contract, in the traditional exercise of managerial authority or in the law for the non-disiplinary
action of the Hospital of not paying employees for time worked and
duties performed.
When an employee absents himself from a portion of his shift
or tour without authority, such as by arriving late or as in this
case improperly leaving early, the traditional approach is to
"dock" him for the time absent and/or to impose some disciplinary
penalty.

But he is paid for the time he worked and for the work

performed within that time.

-2In my view a different procedure requires explicit contract
authorization.

A practice or policy of denying an employee pay

for the entire tour or shift when he fails to complete his assigned
hours and duties is not sufficient to validate the Hospital's
action.

Here, the "practice" relied on by the Hospital does not

serve the purposes for which "past practice" is relevant.

It does

not clarify an ambiguous contract clause, nor has the Hospital
shown that it constitutes a bilaterally accepted policy which
legislates a new term or condition into the collective bargaining
agreement.

Rather, the "practice or policy" relates to no specific

contract provision, but rather sets up a condition of employment
unilaterally promulgated by the Hospital and not negotiated with
the Union.

The evidence of what the Union knew of this practice

or policy is inconclusive.

Under those circumstances I cannot

find support for the practice or policy in the management rights
clause nor can I conclude that it overturns the traditional rules
in such matters.
I recognize that the grievants in this case are physicians
and that their unauthorized absence from a part of a tour may be
particularly disruptive to patient care and hospital administra'
tion.

But this is a collective bargaining relationship and absent

special provisions the traditional collective bargaining rules must
apply.

Indeed, though the Hospital asserts that its action in

depriving the grievants of any pay for January 17th because they
worked only a portion of the day was not disciplinary, I fail to
see how the refusal to pay for the time worked is anything but a

-3penalty.
Again, absent the negotiation of an applicable contract provision, the Hospital's remedy when, as here, it concludes that
employees are engaged in an illegal strike or job action, is to
take appropriate disciplinary action, clearly so identified.
I reject however the Union's claim that the grievants are
entitled to a full day's pay for January 17th.
to pay only for the time worked.

They are entitled

It is not for the grievants or

the Union to decide whether all duties were performed within the
shortened tour.

Rather, the Hospital has the right to require

and expect its employees to work the full tours as assigned.

Hence

I deny the Union's claim that because the grievants allegedly
completed their duties before they left their tours early they
should be paid for the full day, and I need not decide if in fact
any of them completed all their duties in the self-shortened time.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Hospital's action in not paying approximately 72 interns and residents a day's pay
on January 17, 1979 when said employees did
not complete tours of duties violated the
contract to the extent that the employees involved are entitled to be paid for the actual
time they worked on that day. The Hospital
shall compensate the grievants accordingly.

DATED: September 29, 1980
STATE OF New York )
' q Q .
COUNTY OF New York ) b''
On this twenty-ninth day
ally came and appeared Eric J.
to be the individual described
instrument and he acknowledged

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

of September, 1980 before me personSchmertz to me known and known to me
in and who executed the foregoing
to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Amalgamated Local Union 355
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Northville Industries, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties by failing to properly classify and compensate employee
Richard Valentine; if so what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held on January 8, 1980 at which time Mr.
Valentine and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant occupied the job of Platform Operating Class I;
was a type of leadman over a crew; and worked on the Company's
offshore oil/docking platform.

For performing leadman duties he

was paid 15^ an hour over the Class I Operator's rate.
In the summer of 1978 he developed an illness which made
it hazardous if not impossible for him to work on the offshore
platform.
maintenance

The Company transfered him to a shoreside job performing
duties on

a barge.

his higher Platform Operator rate.

it continued to pay him
When the barge maintenance

work ran out, the grievant returned to the offshore platform, but
continued to experience serious difficulties due to his illness.
After about two months the grievant learned of a shore-side

-2vacancy as an assistant gauger.
job and was given it.

He asked the Company for the

On receipt of his first pay check he

learned that he had been reduced in pay from the Class I Platform
Operator rate to the top of the rate for assistant gauger, a loss
of $1.40

an hour.

Thereafter, up to the present, the grievant

has continued to receive the assistant gauger's pay rate.

The

grievant claims that in discussion with Company representatives
at the time he was given the assistant gauger job; and in subsequent talks, he was assured that within a few months time his pay
cut would be restored.

The Company denies any such

agreement.

That the higher pay rate has not been restored is the gravamen
of the grievance.
The evidence and testimony regarding the alleged discussions
between the grievant and Company officials regarding restoration
of the pay cut, are sharply conflicting, inconclusive, and hence
indeterminative.

I find no contractual violation in what the

Company did with and for the grievant.

It is undisputed that

while he was ill, he could not safely perform the Platform
Operator's work, and that on the platform he could not obtain the
type of food needed to treat his ailment0

The move to maintenance

work on the barge was not objected to inasmuch as the grievant
continued to receive the higher rate of pay.

The evidence clearly

establishes that that work was of a temporary nature; indeed that
is affirmed by the grievant's return, without objection to the
platform when the maintenance work ended.

The grant to the

-3 -

grievant of the assistant gauger job was consistent with the job
assignment and seniority provisions of the contract.

And the pay

rate which attached to that assignment, namely the top of the
range for that job, was proper under the contract.

I find nothing

in the contract which would accord the grievant any right to
his higher platform operator rate while classified, at his request,
in the lower rated assistant gauger position.
The Union's claims not withstanding I find none of the
direct arrangements between the Company and the grievant to be
any way inconsistent with the contract.

Hence I reject the

Union's claim that as the grievant's collective bargaining agent
it was improperly bypassed in any of these transactions.
Accordingly, considering the foregoing, and having found
inadequate proof of any extra-contractual agreement to pay the
grievant at his Platform Operator's rate while working as an
assistant gauger, or any agreement to

restore all or part of his

pay cut within a period of time, the Union's claim of improper
pay and classification is rejected.
However, throughout the dealings between the grievant and
the Company, I conclude there was, or the grievant had reasonable
grounds to believe there was, an implicit understanding that if
and when the grievant recovered from his illness, he would be
restored to his job on the off-shore platform.

The Company readil

acknowledges that the grievant is an excellent worker and employee,
and that his work on the platform was entirely satisfactory.

His

-4illness was bona fide and beyond his fault and control.

He left

the platform out of necessity, and would not have done so but
for his illness.

I think it safe

to say that but for his illness

the Company would have expected and wanted him to continue working as a Platform Operator.
He is now well, or at least the record before me so indicates, and that is not disputed by the Company.

Therefore

the grievant shall be given the opportunity to return to the
platform, as a Class I Platform Operator, and, based on his
seniority, may do so now even if it means displacing a junior
employee presently working in that capacity.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its classification
of and compensation to Richard Valentine.
However, Mr. Valentine shall now be afforded
the opportunity to return to his original
job of Platform Operator Class I.

DATED: January 28, 1980
STATE OF New
New York )
)
.
oS • .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty eighth day of January, 1980 before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

I
ii In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Amalgamated Local Union 355
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Northville Industries, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties by failing to properly classify and compensate employee
Richard Valentine; if so what shall the remedy be?
A hearing was held on January 8, 1980 at which time Mr.
Valentine and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant occupied the job of Platform Operating Class I;
was a type of leadman over a crew; and wo^ed on the Company's

i
offshore oil/docking platform.

For performing leadman duties he

i

was paid 15^ an hour over the Class I Operator's rate.
In the summer of 1978 he developed an illness which made
it hazardous if not impossible for him to work on the offshore

•

platform.

The Company transfered him to a shoreside job performing
i
maintenance
duties on a barge.
it continued to pay him
;
his higher Platform Operator rate. When the barge maintenance
I
work ran out, the grievant returned to the offshore platform, but j
continued to experience serious difficulties due to his illness.
After about two months the grievant learned of a shore-side

j

-2vacancy as an assistant gauger.
job and was given it.

He asked the Company for the

On receipt of his first pay check he

i
learned that he had been reduced in pay from the Class I Platform ,
I
I
Operator rate to the top of the rate for assistant gauger, a loss

of $1.40

an hour.

Thereafter, up to the present, the grievant

has continued to receive the assistant gauger's pay rate.

The

grievant claims that in discussion with Company representatives
at the time he was given the assistant gauger job; and in subsej
quent talks, he was assured that within a few months time his pay i

cut would be restored.

The Company denies any such

agreement.

That the higher pay rate has not been restored is the gravamen
;

of the grievance.
The evidence and testimony regarding the alleged discussions.
i
between the grievant and Company officials regarding restoration :
(

of the pay cut, are sharply conflicting, inconclusive, and hence
indeterminative.

I find no contractual violation in what the

Company did with and for the grievant.

It is undisputed that

while he was ill, he could not safely perform the Platform

i
i
I
j

Operator's work, and that on the platform he could not obtain the
type of food needed to treat his ailment.

The move to maintenance

work on the barge was not objected to inasmuch as the grievant
continued to receive the higher rate of pay.

The evidence clearly

establishes that that work was of a temporary nature; indeed that
is affirmed by the grievant's return, without objection to the
platform when the maintenance work ended.

The grant to the

-3grievant of the assistant gauger job was consistent with the job

I
assignment and seniority provisions of the contract.

And the pay

rate which attached to that assignment, namely the top of the
range for that job, was proper under the contract.

I

I find nothingj

in the contract which would accord the grievant any right to
his higher platform operator rate while classified, at his request!,
in the lower rated assistant gauger position.
The Union's claims not withstanding I find none of the
direct arrangements between the Company and the grievant to be
any way inconsistent with the contract.

Hence I reject the

Union's claim that as the grievant's collective bargaining agent
it was improperly bypassed in any of these transactions.
Accordingly, considering the foregoing, and having found

i
inadequate proof of any extra-contractual agreement to pay the

I
grievant at his Platform Operator's rate while working as an
assistant gauger, or any agreement to

restore all or part of his

i
pay cut within a period of time, the Union's claim of improper
pay and classification is rejected.
However, throughout the dealings between the grievant and
the Company, I conclude there was, or the grievant had reasonable
grounds to believe there was, an implicit understanding that if
and when the grievant recovered from his illness, he would be
restored to his job on the off-shore platform.

The Company readil

acknowledges that the grievant is an excellent worker and employee,
and that his work on the platform was entirely satisfactory.

.

'

His

-4illness was bona fide and beyond his fault and control.

He left :

the platform out of necessity, and would not have done so but
j

for his illness.

I think it safe

to say that but for his illness

the Company would have expected and wanted him to continue working as a Platform Operator.
He is now well, or at least the record before me so indicates, and that is not disputed by the Company.

Therefore

the grievant shall be given the opportunity to return to the
platform, as a Class I Platform Operator, and, based on his
seniority, may do so now even if it means displacing a junior
employee presently working in that capacity.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by its classification
of and compensation to Richard Valentine.
However, Mr. Valentine shall now be afforded
the opportunity to return to his original
job of Platform Operator Class I.

DATED: January 28, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss . :
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty eighth day of January, 1980 before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to !
me to be the individual described in and who executed the fore- j
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council,

IBEW

A W A R D
Case #1330 0348 79

and
Public Service Electric & Gas Co

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties make the following AWARD
The five day suspensions of M. Smalley
and R. Orzechowski are reduced to reprimands and one hour's loss of pay already assessed against each. They
shall be made whole for the five days
lost.

Eric J. Schmertz
Cha irman

Charles D. Wolfe
Concurring

DATED: February 4, 1980
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Malcolm C. Sawhill
Dissenting

On this fourth day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED: February
1980
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Charles D. Wolfe to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: February
1980
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Malcolm C. Sawhill to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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and
Public Service Electric & Gas Co

The stipulated issue is:
Were the five day disciplinary suspensions
of M. Smalley and R. Orzechowski for proper
cause under the terms of the agreement?
Also in dispute is the Union's claim that
the two employees should not have been each
docked one hour's pay.
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association
on October 22, 1979 at which time Messrs. Smalley and Orzechowski,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
taken.

A stenographic record was

The Board of Arbitration consisting of the Undersigned as

Chairman and Messrs. Malcolm C. Sawhill and Charles D. Wolfe,
the Company and Union designees repectively, met in executive
session on January 29, 1980.
What the grievants did was wrong, but I conclude their
error was one of judgement rather than misconduct.
During working time and at the location where they were

-2performing their regular duties, they used Company equipment to
assist two youths in installing a motor in an automobile.

It is

not clear how much time was consumed, but the Company docked each
grievant one hour's pay, representing the "middle ground" of how
much time the Company thought was used for that purpose.
I reject the Union's claim that the grievants acted merely
as "good Samaritans" or in the furtherance of good public relations, similar to assistance given to members of the public with
cars caught in snow drifts or otherwise stranded, or in distress.
The latter examples involve emergencies or circumstances that
threaten the affected person's well being, where assistance by
Company employees is commendable and expected.

The instant case

involves no such situation of distress or emergency.
On the other hand I reject the Company's assertion that
what the grievants did was misuse of Company time, comparable to
when employees are found in a bar during their regular working
time.

Clearly the latter example is a purposeful act of decep-

tion and misconduct.

The instant case does not involve a wrong-

ful act of that type and is therefore not analagous.
The grievants are long service employees, highly skilled
and rated, and with unblemished prior records.

Their assistance

to the youths caused no reported delay in the full performance
of their assignments and they received no pay or any other
consideration for their assistance.

They did not hide what they

did, but rather installed the motor in broad public view, and

-4did so because they feared the two youths might hurt themselves
working alone.
That they should not have taken Company time and used
Company equipment for this purpose is manifest, but I am not
convinced that their offense was misconduct in any traditional
sense.

Rather I am persuaded they lost sight of the conditions

under which the public should be assisted, and in that sense
used poor judgement.
What is warranted under the circumstances is corrective
discipline, rather than a disciplinary penalty.

With that

delineation I do not find cause for a five day disciplinary
suspension.

I do find cause for a reprimand and for the loss of

the one hour's pay already assessed and am satisfied the
"proper cause" provision of the contract is met by that
corrective action.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
February 4, 1980
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Reuters, Limited

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of John Sopack? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association in New York City on February 12, March
6, March 20, March 27, May 6, May 8, July 21, July 28 and July
30, 1980 at which time Mr. Sopack, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

Post-hearing briefs were submitted.

The Employer's charges against the grievant for which he
was discharged are:
1) an attempted extortion of liquor from
a manager, admidst strong evidence that
he had successfully extorted liquor from
a former manager;
2) continual threats against other employees, including a threat with a knife
against a manager;
3) physical harassment of a fellow employee of such severity that the victim
refused a transfer to a position that
would have brought her in close proximity
with the grievant.

-2The Employer contends that each offense standing alone,
or in any combination, or cumulatively, constitute grounds for
summary discharge.
Except for portions of charges 2 and 3 which in my view
would require progressive discipline (warnings/suspension
prior to discharge) I do not quarrel with the Employer's assessment of the severe nature of these charges.

I agree that taken

together the penalty of discharge would be proper and that
offense #1 and other portions of 2 and 3 standing alone would
be grounds for summary dismissal provided that in all cases the
disciplinary penalty was properly imposed.
In the instant matter, though the case consumed nine days
of hearing and an extensive record maintained by the Arbitrator
as well as exhibits and briefs, the answer to the stipulated
issue is compelled by one of the most well settled and universally accepted rules of industrial relations and arbitration law.
That rule is that discipline must be imposed promptly following
the misconduct or offense committed or following the point at
which the employer learned or should have known that the misconduct or offense was committed.

An employer's failure to act

promptly is traditionally interpreted as condonation or acquiescence, and a waiver of the right to thereafter take disciplinary action for that offense.

The well recognized legal principle

of estoppel applies.
The Employer's case in this proceeding founders on that
rule even assuming arguendo, that the grievant committed the
offenses charged.

For that reason I make no determination one

way or the other on whether the grievant is guilty or innocent
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of any or all of the Employer's allegations against him.
It is undisputed that the grievant's discharge took place
on September 25, 1979; that the aforementioned offenses on which
the discharge was based occurred or were ongoing from ten months
to one year earlier; and that during the interim period the
grievant was not warned, suspended or in any way disciplined for
those things which the Employer now claims he did.
It is clear and I am satisfied that these offenses,
assuming they were committed by the grievant, were known when
they occurred or soon thereafter to specific managerial/supervisory employees.

Indeed in charges 1 and 2 managerial personnel

were the claimed victims.

Those managerial employees were

authorized representatives of the Employer with the authority
to impose discipline and with the duty to report any such severe
misconduct to higher authority.

That they failed to take disci-

plinary action or to report the situation to top management until
months later (when it came to the attention of senior management
almost inadvertently) does not mean that the Employer, through
its authorized managerial agent, did not know or have constructive notice of what it now claims the grievant did, within the
meaning of the previously cited, universally accepted rule for
the imposition of discipline.
The Employer's explanation as to why those managerial employees failed to take prompt disciplinary action or neglected
to report the circumstances to higher levels does not excuse the
Employer from its responsibilities under the rule.

Managers

who have the authority to impose discipline and to maintain

-4proper conduct among the bargaining unit employees also have a
corresponding duty to act decisively and courageously in carrying
out those rights and responsibilities.

It is no excuse to now

explain that they were frightened of or intimidated by the
grievant.

Their timidity and abdication of their responsibilities

under the circumstances as alleged nonetheless imputes as a
matter of lav, the consequences of waiver and estoppel to the
Employer and to those higher level Employer representatives who
finally took disciplinary action ten months to one year subsequent to the events charged.
As I have indicated the enunciated rule requiring prompt
discipline following the commission of an offense is preeminent,
and should be upheld even if it means that an employer is
frustrated from dismissing an employee of unquestioned
ability.

Due process demands that result.

undesir-

As also stated I

have not decided that the grievant is innocent of the charges
anymore than I have concluded that he is culpable.
my ruling in this matter, those offenses, even if
are no longer actionable for discipline.

However with
committed,

The employment relation-

ship between the grievant and the Employer must start afresh
so far as the grievant*s disciplinary record is concerned.

The

grievant should recognize that though the record contains evidence
in support of the charges against him, those charges have not
been decided upon the merits and that his

reinstatement is based

upon a principle of due process which is more important to labormanagement relations and to decision making in arbitration cases
than is the employment status of a single employee.

Therefore

he should be mindful that any acts on his part of the type

-5referred to in the charges against him in this case, or other
comparable acts of misconduct or violations of working rules
including retaliation, would in the judgement of this arbitrator
constitute grounds for disciplinary action including discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
Without deciding whether John Sopack committed any or all of the offenses charged
against him, but because the Employer failed to take disciplinary action promptly or
within a reasonable time after it learned
or should have known through its authorized
managerial representatives of the incidents
upon which the discharge was based, the discharge of John Sopack was not for just cause.
Mr. Sopack shall be reinstated with full
seniority and back pay less his earnings from
gainful employment elsewhere during the period
of his discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 17, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
q q

•

On this seventeenth day of October, 1980 before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the matter of the Arbitration
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and
Rogers Corporation

The two stipulated unrelated issues are:
1. Whether or not in accordance with
Article 10, Section 10-4 (B) (7) of
the 1979-82 Agreement, the effective
date of the furlough was October 22,
1979? If not what shall the remedy be?
2. Did the Company violate Article 11
Section 11-5 of the 1979-82 Agreement
with respect to the grievance dated
November 5, 1979? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held in East Norwich, Connecticut on May 7,
1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was duly administered.

Company filed a post-hearing brief.

The

(The Union summarized its

case at the conclusion of the oral hearing.)
Issue #1 (Grievance

79-5)

The question involved in this issue is whether a contractual
furlough commences on the day immediately following the last day
that the affected employee actively works, whether or not the next
immediate day falls on or during a weekend or on a regular work
day; or whether the furlough commences only on the affected
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employee's next regular work day.

The employees involved in the

instant dispute were given notice of their furlough on October 18,
1979 for the weeks of October 22 and 29.
was Friday, October 19, 1979.

Their last day worked

They all returned from furlough by

Monday, November 5, 1979.
It is the Company's position that the furlough began on
Monday, October 22, the next work day which the employees would
have been actively employed but for the furlough, and continued
for not more than fifteen calendar days thereafter.

On that

basis the Company asserts that Article 10 Section 10-4 (B) (7)
was not activated and that those employees had no right to exercise
displacement rights under that provision of the contract.
The Union contends that the furlough should have commenced
on the very next day following the last day worked, namely on
October 20, and that consequently more than fifteen calendar days
elapsed before November 5 when the employees returned to work.
It asserts therefore that the failure or refusal of the Company
to permit those employees to exercise their displacement rights
after the fifteenth calendar day violated the contract.
Obviously, if the Company is correct, the displacement right
provisions of the contract had not ripened for the affected
employees and the grievance must be denied.

If the Union is

correct, the Company erred by extending the furlough beyond the
allowable period without permitting the exercise of displacement
rights and the grievance should be granted with an appropriate
remedy.
Article 10 Section 10-4 (B) (7) in pertinent part reads:

-3In any event, any employee or employees
so furloughed will be able to exercise
his or her displacement rights after
fifteen (15) calendar days in accordance
with Section 10-4.
A bare reading of the foregoing relevant contract language,
particularly the reference to "fifteen (15 calendar days"
suggests, based on traditional contract interpretation, that the
furlough begins on the day immediately following the last day
actively worked regardless both of what day in the week that next
day may be and whether it would have been a work day, inasmuch
as any day in the week is a "calendar day."
But this otherwise normal interpretation is changed by the
express definition of a "furlough" found in Article 10 Section
10-5 (A) of the contract.

It reads:

(A) FurloughTemporary removal of an employee from
scheduled work by Management for a prearranged, definite period of time - during which time the employee remains on
the active payroll and retains benefits
under the terms of the Labor Agreement.
Significantly the foregoing defintion of a furlough is not
just the "temporary removal of an employee. . . . for a prearranged, definite period of time. . . .", but rather a temporary
removal
"from scheduled work by Management."
(emphasis added)
In the instant case, after the affected employees completed
work on Friday, October 19, 1979, they would not again have been
scheduled for work by the Company until the commencement of the
next regular work week, on Monday, October 22.

If their furlough

began, as the Union contends, on Saturday, October 20, it would

-4have begun at a time when they would not have been scheduled to
work, and would not then have been a "removal from scheduled work."
By contrast, the official commencement of their furlough on the
following Monday was the first moment that their removal from
active employment coincided with scheduled work they would have
performed but for the furlough.

I consider it proper and

appropriate to read Sections 10-4 (B) (7) and 10-5 together.

On

that basis, I must conclude that the beginning of the furlough
on October 22, 1979 was contractually proper.

With that inter-

pretation, it follows that the furlough consumed no more than
fifteen calendar days.

Consequently the displacement right pro-

visions of the contract did not come into play.
Based on the record before me I find that the foregoing interpretation is consistent with a long standing and unrefuted past
practice and in accord with testimony adduced by the Company,
again essentially unrefuted, that the fifteen calendar day provision was agreed to by the Company (and reduced from a thirty
day provision in the previous contract) so long as the Company
could furlough employees two full and consecutive work weeks without triggering the displacement provision of the contract.
That the Company may apply differently other clauses of the
contract (such as the layoff provisions) where the relevant contract
language is the same, are inconsistencies which I have considered
but which I do not find sufficiently significant to bring about
the result which the Union seeks herein.
Accordingly Grievance #79-5 is denied.
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Issue #2 (Grievance

79-4)

Article 11 Section 11-5 of the contract reads:
Any time a grievance is not answered
within the specified time limit it
shall be settled as noted in "Settlement
Desired" on the grievance form. Saturdays,
Sundays and Holidays shall not be counted
in the time limit. The time limit in any
step may be extended by mutual consent of
the parties .
It is the Union's claim herein that the Company forfeited the
Union's grievance dated November 5, 1979 (involving washup time)
by failing to answer at the second Step of the grievance procedure
within the prescribed time limit.

Step 2 of the grievance pro-

cedure reads:
The following parties shall meet to discuss
the grievance at a mutually convenient time
within seventy-two (72) hours after submission
of the grievance to this step: All of the
parties who participated at the first step
plus the Oak Lodge Vice President of the area
involved; the Oak Lodge Recording Secretary;
and the Production/Plant/Engineering Manager
of the area and the Personnel Supervisor. If
no satisfactory agreement is reached by discussion, the Union may state its position in
writing and submit it to the Production/Plant/
Engineering Manager who will answer in writing
within three (3) days. The Union may request
that the grievance be entered into Step 3 by
submitting it in the written form to the
Division Manager.
The Union's claim of forfeiture fails on at least two grounds.
First, the Union asserts that the Company has forfeited '(and there
fore must grant) the grievance because it did not answer the
grievance within three (3) days.

However a reading of Step 2

clearly shows that the three day limit does not begin to run

-6until after the parties have met to discuss the grievance "at a
mutually convenient time within seventy-two (72) hours after
submission to this step."

It is noted that forfeiture occurs if

a grievance is "not answered within the specified time limit. . .",
(emphasis added) not if the parties delay in meeting to discuss
the grievance.

Therefore in the instant case the Union's claim

of forfeiture based upon a failure of the Company to answer the
grievance within three days is premature, because the critical
three day answering period had not begun to run.
Assuming arguendo that the Company received the grievance
within the meaning and provision of Step 2 on the morning of
November 12, 1979, the Company's offer on November 16 to hold a
grievance meeting, while not in strict compliance with the seventytwo hour provision, was certainly in substantial compliance therewith, and in my judgement should not be deemed fatal, particularly
in view of the provision of Section 11-5 which limits forfeitures
to a failure to "answer."

Of course if it is concluded that the

Company did not receive the grievance until November 13, when it
first came to the attention of Harold Cloud, the designated
Company representative at the second Step, the Company's offer on
November 16 to hold a grievance meeting was within the seventy-two
hour time limit, if, as I do not think, that time limit required
strict compliance.
Second, the Union's claim of forfeiture fails because the
Union itself did not comply with the Step 2 requirements.

It is

axiomatic that a party seeking strict compliance must itself be
in strict compliance to hold the other side to the specific contract

-7provisions.

Step 2 requires that the Union "state its position

in writing and submit it to the
"Production/Plant/Engineering

Manager. . ."

Here the Union gave the written grievance on November 12,
not to that contractual identified Company representative, but
rather to Dennis Gladu a Supervisor, and asked him to give it
to Stan Karro, the General Foreman.

Neither of these two Company

officials are the Production/Plant/Engineering Manage»«e-t referre
to in Step 2.
The Union representative had placed the grievance in a sealed
envelope, and gave that envelope to Gladu.

Though Gladu states

he recognized it as a grievance, (by the form which he could see
through the punched holes in the transmittal envelope) he did not
know the nature of the dispute and merely placed the unopened
envelope on Karro's desk.

Karro was on vacation on Monday,

November 12 and did not find the envelope until November 13th.
On that day he took the grievance to Cloud, the Plant Manager.
The Union does not contest the Company's assertion that Cloud was
and had regularly served as the Company's second Step representative, and was the "Plant Manager" who met the contractual status
of "Production/Plant/Engineering Manager" under the Step 2
language.
I conclude therefore that the Union did not specifically comply
with the requirements of Step 2 by failing to submit its grievance
at that step to the required Company representative.

Neither

Gladu nor Karro can be deemed as Cloud's agents, and submission
of the grievance to either or both is not submission to the Plant
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Manager.

Hence, the Union's claim of forfeiture on November 15

was not yet three days after the authorized Company representative
had received the grievance, and was therefore premature.

Accord-

ingly, Union grievance 79-4 is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Grievance 79-5
In accordance with Article 10 Section 10-4
(B) (7) of the 1979-82 Agreement, the effective
date of the furlough was October 22, 1979.
Grievance

79-4

The Company did not violate Article 11
Section 11-5 of the 1979-82 Agreement with
respect to the grievance dated November 5,
1979.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

July 28, 1980

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
District 15, Lodge 315, IAMAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K/26906

and
Schering Corporation

In accordance with Section 30 of the collective bargaining
agreement dated December 29, 1978 between the above-named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company have just cause for imposing
the type of discipline it did on various employees for their actions on July 15, 1979?
If not, what should be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company's offices in Kenilworth,
New Jersey on March 17, 1980 at which time representatives of the
Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
PERTINENT CONTRACT CLAUSES

The following clauses in the 1979-1981 Agreement are
applicable to this case at the present time:
ATTENDANCE
Regular availability of employees is
essential for effective business operations.
Excessive absences for either illness or
personal reasons can adversely affect individual
and group productivity. In order to administer

-2attendance control in a fair and consistent
manner, the Company maintains records of
absences and absence occurrences on a calendar year basis. An employee is charged with
an absence occurrence for any of the following forms of absence:
(3) Three latenesses. A lateness is defined as not being at the assigned work
place ready to start work at the scheduled
starting time.
Not all absences are counted as absence
occurrences. For example :
(4)

Fewer than three latenesses.

...In all instances in which an employee
reaches the level of six absence occurrences
during a calendar year, he may expect his
supervisor to initiate a discussion to review
the nature and causes of absences. The Employee
will be notified his steward is available if
he so requests. The primary purpose of such
discussions is to improve attendance and to
insure appropriate corrective action. If
appropriate, the supervisor may issue a formal
oral warning at the conclusion of the discussion
concerning attendance. Following such an action,
if attendance does not improve satisfactorily,
an employee is subject to further disciplinary
action ranging from formal written warnings up
to and including discharge.
31.

Discharge, Suspension or Disciplinary Action

...Where disciplinary warnings are made in
writing, copies thereof will be sent to the Chief
Steward and the Business Representative. Such
written disciplinary warnings or reprimands will
be expunged from the employee's personnel records
after one (1) year. Before discharging or suspending any employee, the Shop Steward will be
granted the opportunity for an interview before
the employee is required to leave the premises.
Appendix C
3.

The parties agreed that the fourth sentence

-3of paragraph 1, Section 31, page 31 of the
contract, which provides: "Such written
disciplinary warnings or reprimands will be
expunged from the employee's personnel records
after one year."--shall be interpreted to mean
that he must go one yar and have a record free
from the same offense before the record is
expunged.
BACKGROUND
The Company manufactures pharmaceutical products.

The

instant case arose on July 15, 1979 at which time the Company had
ceased all production for the annual shutdown.

The maintenance

staff is specifically precluded from taking any vacation time
during the shutdown period so that major maintenance work can be
performed.

The Company scheduled all of the maintenance employees

to work on Sunday, July 15, 1979 and in accordance with the Agreement each employee was entitled to the double time rate of pay.
The Agreement also provided for a 30 minute lunch break for each
employee.

The procedure in the Maintenance Department required

that any time an employee leaves the building for lunch the employee must go to the maintenance supervisor's office in order to
sign out on a timesheet entitled "OFF HOURS"; upon returning from
lunch each employee is then required to sign in on the same timesheet.
The parties stipulated that the employee manual contains
the same information that appears in Appendix A of the Agreement.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPANY
The Company contends that certain employees violated these
rules and practices on July 15, 1979.

First, at approximately

11:55 AM a substantial number of employees signed out and indicated
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a sign out time of 12:00 noon.

Some of the employees, however,

signed out and indicated a sign out time of 12:15 PM, 12:20 PM,
or 12:30 PM.

Employees Singer and Pearse were the first employees

to indicate a sign out time of 12:15 PM.

Thereafter, five air

conditioning mechanics, one electrician, and two clerks signed out
and specified times of either 12:20 PM or 12:30 PM.

The super-

visor of the five air conditioning mechanics happened to be in a
guardhouse at the plant exit and saw the five air conditioning
mechanics leave the plant in a car at 12:01 PM.

The Company asserts

that the two clerks and electrician signed back in at 12:40 PM
and that the five air conditioning mechanics signed back in at
12:50 PM.

The Company maintains that a supervisor confronted the

employees at this point and informed them that they had overstayed
their 30 minte lunch break and that they had falsified the timesheet.

The Company also alleges that the employees admitted these

facts at the time.

On the basis of this conduct, the Company

docked the employees for the excess time that they had taken for
lunch and issued a warning letter to each employee.
At approximately 1:20 PM the remaining employees returned
essentially in bulk and indicated a 1:30 PM sign in time on the
register sheet.

A maintenance supervisor told the employees that

inasmuch as they had returned to the plant so late it was senseless to go back to work.

The supervisor therefore sent the

employees home for the remainder of the day and also announced
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that further discipline would be imposed.
The supervisor noted that employees Singer and Pearse had
not checked back in by that time.
ployees in the parking lot.

A foreman found these two em-

After the foreman motioned to these

employees to come into the office, they did so.
In summary, the discipline imposed upon the employees who
returned at 1:30 PM consisted of receiving a written warning,
being sent home for the balance of the shift which was scheduled
to end at 3:45 PM, and losing pay for the time after the scheduled
lunch break.

Employees Singer and Pearse received an additional

2 day suspension for overstaying the lunch period and falsifying
the timesheet because they had previously received a suspension
for similar conduct.
The Company presented two witnesses in support of its
position.

The first witness, Joseph Grossano, was the Utilities

Supervisor on July 15, 1979.

After testifying that July 15, 1979

fell within the period that the plant was shutdown for maintenance
programs, the witness stated that he was in the maintenance supervisor's office just before noon on that day in anticipation of the
lunch breaks.

The initial group of employees came into the area

in a large group.
and the foremen.

Grossano observed bantering between the employees
Then the air conditioning group of employees

came into the area and signed out.

The witness testified to the

entries on the timesheets which were received into evidence as
Company Exhibit 1.

In particular, Grossano indicated that employees

Singer and Pearse had signed out with the first group. Grossano
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stated that he remebered that a few seconds later — during a
period he described as "dead" time--he saw employees Cooley, Seery
and Duff sign out.
At 12:10 PM a foreman picked up the clipboard that contained the sign out sheets in order to make a routine check of
them.

The foreman noticed that the sign out times varied from

12:00 PM to 12:30 PM.

The witness then talked with James Ruane,

the air conditioning foreman, who related that he had seen the
air conditioning employees leave the plant while he was in the
guardhouse.

The guardhouse clock showed that it was

12:01 PM.

Grossano confirmed that the cafeteria is normally closed during
the shutdown and is always closed on Sundays.

He also testified

that there had been a planned power outage in the plant so that
preventive maintenance could be performed on certain switch gear.
Grossano was present when the air conditioning group of
employees returned at 12:50 PM; Ruane was also present.

The witness

informed the employees that they were back late and that their
sign out time had been wrong.

He then told the employees that

they would be docked for the excess time and more discipline would
follow.

One employee, Mr. Glen Brown, (who subsequently did not

sign a grievance) responded that they had signed out late at 12:30
PM, had come back late, and had been wrong.
by the other employees.

There were no denials

The witness did not see employees Cooley,

Seery, and Duff sign in or know when they had come back.

Grossano

then sent the air conditioning employees back to their jobs.
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At 1:00 PM the remaining employees had not returned to the
plant.

The witness went to Building 14 and found Tom Brennan, a

Union Steward, and they went back to the office in Building 9 for
*
the return of the remaining employees.
1:20 PM and were boisterous.

The employees returned at

Although not all faces were visible,

the witness recognized the voice of Nick Manos who said that, "We
don't want any lectures, we know we're late."

The witness heard

the following comments: "So we had a couple of beers.
want to work today.

We were forced to work today."

We didn't
Grossano ex-

plained that Sunday work is mandatory during the shutdown and that
employees are required to work or be available for work for 7 days
during the shutdown time.
The witness noted that some of the employees had signed in,
two employees were not present, and some did not sign in.
witness held all of the employees in the maintenance
order to address the entire group.

The

office in

A foreman found Singer and

Pearse in the parking lot and brought them to the office.
the employees were in the office by 1:25 PM.

All of

Grossano addressed

the group
and told then that they had overstayed lunch a lot and
.
that this would affect the work timetable.

He continued that the

employees could not do much work during the balance of the day
and that no more work would be accomplished that day.

He there-

fore directed the employees to go home and said they would be
subject to further discipline on Monday.

The witness indicated

that it was 1:30 PM by then and that the usual break would have
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been at 2:00 PM.

He reasoned that by the time the employees

would have gone to the plant and would have picked up their tools
it would have been time for the 2:00 PM break.

As a result,

Grossano concluded that there was not sufficient time remaining
for the employees to return to work and complete their assigned
tasks.
After discussing the situation with the maintenance

fore-

men, he made the following recommendations to the personnel depart
ment for disciplinary action:
1) The five air conditioning mechanics plus employees
Cooley, Seery, and Duff admitted they were wrong and were able to
perform their work.

Since they were late, the witness recommended

that each employee should be docked for the amount of time that
lunch had been overstayed and should be given a warning letter for
falsification of the time sheet.
2) The other mechanics who returned at 1:20 PM should be
docked for the amount of time that lunch had been overstayed,
should be given a warning letter, and should receive a one-half
day suspension that was considered to have been already served
since the employees were sent home for the balance of the shift
on July 15, 1979.

The witness testified that this group of 12

employees warranted different treatment from the first group of
8 employees because the 12 employees had returned 40 minutes later
than the 8 employees, had been noisy and defiant, and had created
a situation in which there was no point for them to return to work
that afternoon.
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3) Singer and Pearse should receive an extra 2 day suspension—in addition to the discipline imposed upon the group of 12
employees—because

they knew that falsifying the sign out sheet

violated Company rules since each of them had received a suspension for similar action in February
The recommendations

1977.

of the witness were implemented and

are the subject of Grievances A 9540, 8544 and 8546, respectively.
On redirect examination, Grossano testified that 50 to 60
bargaining unit employees were scheduled to work on July 15, 1979.
No other employees had problems.

As to employees Singer and Pearse,

the witness stressed that he personally saw them sign out seconds
after the entry was made by the number 14 employee on the timesheet.

The foreman brought over the timesheet at 12:10 PM, accord-

ing to the witness' watch, but the final group of employees had
already signed out and had indicated the time to be either 12:20
PM or 12:30 PM.
The Company called James Ruane, a Heating, Ventilation,
and Air Conditioning Supervisor who had been the Air Conditioning
Foreman on July 15, 1979.

He testified that he had been in the

guardhouse at the entrance to the plant at 12:00 noon.

His

responsibilities involved supervision of the air conditioning
mechanics.

He saw 5 of them in a car in the parking lot and saw

them leave the lot and go past the guardhouse and leave the plant
at 12:00 noon according to his own watch and at 12:01 PM according
to the clock in the guardhouse.

He subsequently went to the
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maintenance office where he had a discussion with Grossano and
some other foremen during which time he related his observations
from the guardhouse.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union asserts that the Company may discipline for late-ness in accordance with the "lateness occurrence" provisions of
the contract but contends that the Company violated the Agreement
when it imposed the types of disciplinary actions that are the
subject of Grievances 8546, 8544 and A9540.

It argues that an

electrical failure in the plant caused the plant clocks to be out
of order.

The employees used their watches to determine the correct

time to enter on the timesheets.

As to the employees who signed

out at 12:15 PM, the Union claims that only one employee had a
watch and it said 12:15.

The Union insists that the dispute arose

as a result of the clocks being broken and that the employees
would not falsify the timesheet.

The Union notes that the cafe-

teria in the plant was closed so that the employees had to go out
to eat at eating places that are located 1 to 1% miles away from
the plant and that open at noon.

Since the employees went en masse

to the same 2 or 3 places, the service was not prompt which resulted in the employees coming back late.

The Union maintains

that the Company knew of these circumstances which were due to
conditions beyond the control of the employees and that the discipline should should have only been to dock each employee the excess

-11time taken and to charge each employee with 1/3 of an occurrence.
With respect to the two employees who received an extra 2 day
suspension because of an incident in February 1977, the Union
claims that the Agreement bars the Company from relying upon that
incident because past discipline is to be expunged after an employees record is clean for 1 year.

The Union stresses that the

employees agreed with the suspension for the 1977 incident and
that they paid their punishment then.

The Union also denies that

it was 12:01 PM when the employees left the plant.
The Union presented several witnesses in support of its
position.

The first witness, Robert Rowe, testified on behalf

of the employees who had filed Grievance A 9540 after they had
received warning letters for falsifying the Company records and
had been docked for the excess time taken for lunch.

The witness

indicated that the cafeteria had been closed on July 15, 1979.
Rowe stated that the clocks in the maintenance office were not
working.

Rowe and four other employees signed out together at

12:20 PM and the other employees covered by Grievance A 9540 also
signed out at 12:20 PM except one employee who signed out at 12:30
PM.

The employees went in a car to Juniors which is located 1

mile down Morris Avenue.

The witness explained that he had no

watch because his job included cleaning a water tower and his
watch was not waterproof so he had taken it off.

He washed up

before leaving and put down 12:20 PM on the timesheet.

Rowe stated

that there were no clocks working in the office so he signed out
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5 minutes later than the employee above him on the timesheet who
had indicated a sign out time of 12:15 PM.

The witness acknowledged

that he had returned late after lunch but that this was the first
time he had ever been late so he should only be charged with 1/3
of an occurrence.
The Union then called Edward Fitzsimmons to testify concerning the 12 employees who returned at 1:30 PM and who, as a
result of this conduct, had received warnings and a 1/2 day
suspension.

The witness stated that upon returning from lunch

Ralph Ainsworth yelled to him to get into the office.

In the

office Grossano said that they had come back too late and that
they should go home and would get further notice of discipline.
The witness indicated that the employees had gone to Nichols, a
restaurant, for lunch.
at noon, Fitzsimmons

Although the restaurant should have opened
related that the employees arrived at the

restaurant at 12:10 PM and stood outside for another 10 minutes
before being allowed to enter.

The 12 employees ordered their

food simultaneously, ate, and went directly back to the plant.
The next Union witness was Donald Singer who had been Chief
Steward and currently serves on the Union Executive Board.

He

stated that he ate lunch at Nichols Restaurant with Paul Pearse.
The two employees went to the sign out desk together and signed
out at 12:15 PM according to the time on his watch.
in the office at the time.
slow.

He saw no one

At the restaurant the service was very

Upon returning to the plant, the witness did not sign in

because Ainsworth had said, "Don't bother signing in, you're
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going home."

Singer estimated that he had returned at 1:20 FM but

he had not checked the time on his watch.

Singer received a warn-

ing notice, a 1/2 day suspension, and an extra 2 day suspension.
He believed he was late and therefore thinks he should have
received 1/3 of an occurrence and been docked for the excess time
taken for lunch.
The Union then called Paul Pearse as a witness.

He testi-

fied that he went to lunch with Donald Singer on July 15, 1979.
The witness did not have a watch but signed out immediately after
Singer who had looked at his watch and had written 12:15 PM as the
sign out time.
also.

Thus Pearse recorded 12:15 PM as the sign out time

Pearse affirmed the testimony of Singer.
The Union's last witness was the Chief Steward, August D.

Morreale.

He testified that he is familiar with the Agreement and

that there is not supposed to be any discipline for lateness until
an employee has three latenesses which then become 1 occurrence.
DISCUSSION
The instant case involves three grievances that affect a
total of 20 employees who received various forms of discipline for
certain conduct surrounding the lunch break on Sunday, July 15,
1979.

All three grievances overlap to some extent, however, there

are sufficient distinctions among the grievances to warrant a
separate analysis of each situation.
Grievance A 9540
The first grievance covers the 8 employees who are charged
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with falsifying the timesheet but who returned only a few minutes
late from lunch and were therefore permitted to return to work.
The Union has not grieved the fact that these employees were
docked for the excess time taken for lunch.

The Union does seek,

however, to have the warning letters removed from each employee's
file and, instead, to have each employee charged with 1/3 of an
occurrence for returning back from lunch late.
After having read the disciplinary warnings that were given
to each employee within this category—Company Exhibit 2a through
2h--it is clear to me that the warning letters are exclusively
directed toward the alleged falsifications of the timesheet.

Thus

the question is whether the Company had just cause to conclude
that the employees had falsified the timesheets.
The Company presented testimony that the timesheets were
checked by a foreman and then removed at 12:10 PM.

The Company

also presented testimony that Foreman Ruane had seen the air conditioning mechanics--who were the last employees covered by this
grievance to have signed out--leave the Company's property either
at 12:00 noon according to Mr. Ruane's personal watch or at 12:01
PM according to the clock in the guardhouse where Ruane had been
located.

In my opinion the Union's case failed to refute this

testimony.
Although I am mindful of the fact that there was a planned
power outage that affected the clocks in various buildings at the
plant and therefore may have created some confusion for the employees
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over what was the exact time, I am unable to conclude that this
circumstance excused the employees from ascertaining the correct
time.

For example, Grossano testified on cross-examination that

he was sitting at a foreman's desk within ten feet of the sign out
sheet talking to some of the foremen.

Certainly the employees had

ample opportunity to ask what time it was from any of these people.
Rowe testified on cross-examination that Grossano was not in the
area at the time but that some foremen were.

The reason Rowe

offered for not asking the foremen for the proper time was that he
did not want to disturb their converation.

Instead, Rowe suggested

adding five minutes to the time indicated by the last person to
have signed out.

Even if Grossano or the foremen

did not have a

watch or know what the correct time was, this would have demonstrated
a reasonable attempt on the part of the employees to indicate the
correct time.

That they did not make that effort leads me to

believe that they had another intention in mind.
should be accurate on all occasions.

A timesheet

I believe that the employees

knew or should have known that the Company had a legitimate business
reason for having an accurate timesheet on Sunday, July 15, 1979
particularly because that day was an overtime day on which the
employees received pay at double time.

The failure of each employee

to make a reasonable effort or any effort at all to ascertain the
correct time subjects those employees to the natural consequencesnamely, that they knowingly noted inaccurate or false times, and I
conclude that they did so.
The Union contends that the warning each employee received

-16from the Company is violative of the Agreement because a lateness
is considered to be only a 1/3 absence occurrence pursuant to
Appendix A of the Agreement.

A reading of the warning letters

reflects that the only conduct that is referred to in them is the
falsification of the timesheet.

In light of this fact, the warn-

ing letters do not fall within the provisions or restrictions
concerning employee lateness.

To the extent that the employees

covered by Grievance A 9540 exceeded their allotted time for lunch,
it is undisputed that the Company acted properly in docking them
for the excess time taken for lunch.
Grievance 8544
The second grievance covers the 10 employees who are charged
with overextending their 30 minute lunch period to 1 hour and 20
minutes.

Each employee was sent home for the balance of the shift

on July 15, 1979 and also received a 1/2 day suspension that was
assessed in the subsequent warning notice and deemed to have been
served on July 15, 1979.

The Union seeks to have the suspensions

rescinded, to have the warning letters removed from each employee's
file, to have each employee charged with 1/3 of an occurrence for
returning from lunch late, and to have each employee docked for
the excess time taken for lunch.
From reading the warning letters that were given to each
employee in this category--Company Exhibit 3a through 3L--it is
clear to me that the Attendance Control Program, as embodied in
Appendix "A" of the Agreement and referred to in the Supplemental
Agreement contained in Appendix C of the Agreement, furnishes the
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contractual basis for resolving the issues raised in Grievance
8544.

The Attendance Control Program specifies in great detail

the understanding

that the parties reached "in order to administer

attendance control in a fair and consistent manner. . . . " The
Agreement defines a lateness as "not being at the assigned work
place ready to start work at the scheduled starting time."

It is

undisputed that the employees were not at the assigned work place
ready to start work at the scheduled starting time for the afternoon portion of the shift on July 15, 1979.

Specifically, the

employees who are covered by this grievance signed out for lunch
at 12:00 noon and were entitled to a 30 minute lunch break; they
were therefore due back from lunch at 12:30 PM.

When they failed

to appear at that time, they became late for work.
With respect to the Agreement's provisions for disciplining
employees who are late, the Attendance Control Program specifies
that "a supervisor may hold a discussion with an employee at any
time that there are questions or concerns about the frequency or
number of occurrences." (Emphasis added.)

There is also a pro-

vision for "disciplinary action ranging from formal written warnings up to and including discharge" after a supervisor has initiated
a discussion with an employee concerning the nature and causes of
absences.

This second provision, however, follows a clause that

states, "(i)n all instances in which an employee reaches six
absence occurrences during a calendar year."

I think it clear by

the express language contained in the Agreement that before any
disciplinary action can be taken by the Company in terms of employee

-18absence there must at the very least be an absent occurrence.

The

Attendance Control Program then provides for progressive discipline
including a discussion between the employee and the employee's
supervisor, a formal oral warning, formal written warnings, and
ultimately more severe discipline up to and including discharge.
This sophisticated approach to dealing with problems concerning attendance indicates that the parties were careful in
determining how best to treat employee lateness.

Since the parties

specifically provided that fewer than three latenesses do not count
as an absence occurrence, the Arbitrator must adhere to this provision.

The Agreement therefore requires that the July 15, 1979

lateness be treated as no more than a "1/3 absence occurrence."
The Company has asserted, and the testimony reflects, that
management representatives concluded that it was senseless to
permit the employees to return to work for the balance of the
shift on July 15, 1979 because the lost work time rendered the
employees incapable of completing their assigned tasks in the
allotted time.

In fashioning what it considered to be proper

discipline for the lateness of the employees, the Company, inter
alia, imposed a 1/2 day suspension that was deemed to have been
fulfilled by the employees not having worked for the balance of
the shift on July 15, 1979.

Consequently, there are in actuality

two reasons why the employees did not work during the afternoon:
(1) the initial decision that the employees could not complete
their work; and (2) the retroactive imposition of a 1/2 day suspension for returning late from lunch.

It is clear in my opinion

that the 1/2 day disciplinary suspension does not comport with the
approach set forth in the Agreement because a suspension is not
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the initial remedy that is prescribed by the progressive discipline
structure for a 1/3 absence occurrence.
Whether, alternatively, the Company acted properly with
respect to sending the employees home because it would have been
senseless to permit them to return to work requires analysis.

As

I see it, there may be a point in time during the course of a
shift at which the Company would be justified
the employees to have resumed work.

in not permitting

For example, the hypothetical

situation _raised by Counsel for the Company in which an employee
has reported "late" at one minute prior to quitting time could
well be such a circumstance.

But that is not the instant dispute.

Although in the present case the employees substantially exceeded
their lunch break, a forty minute difference distinguishes the
employees covered by grievance A 9540 who were permitted to return
to work at approximately 12:50 PM and the employees covered by
grievance 8544 who would have resumed work at approximately 1:30
PM had they been permitted to do so.

The question therefore is

whether the forty minutes justified permitting the first group to
return to work while denying that opportunity to the second group.
The testimony concerning the employees' work assignments
as illustrated by Rowe who had been cleaning a cooling tower, by
Singer who had been working in Building 5a, and by Pearse who had
been changing steam traps by himself in Building 2 refutes the
contention by the Company that it would have been senseless for the
employees to have resumed work.

There was no proof that the tasks
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of the various employees were other than ongoing in nature.

So

that the balance of the shift could have been utilized in performing this work which would ultimately have had to be completed in
any event.
Grossano testified that when the employees returned from
lunch they were noisy, boisterious, and defiant.

He implied in

his testimony (which was reenforced by Mr. Fitzsimmons on cross=
examination) that some of the employees covered by grievance 8544
may have consumed alcoholic beverages during lunch.

This testimony

is disregarded in disposing of the propriety of the Company's
action in not permitting the employees to resume work because the
Company failed to allege that any employee was insubordinate or
intoxicated or that those were reasons for deciding not to let
them resume work.

Indeed I think these factors may have been the

real reason why those employees were sent home, but as they are
not relied upon here, I find that the Company failed to prove that
it was senseless for the employees to resume work.
In summation, the Company acted improperly in suspending
the employees by sending them home at 1:30 PM.

The employees are

entitled to be made whole for their lost earnings from that point
in time until the scheduled end of the shift at 3:45 PM.

The

written warning notice should be rescinded and removed from each
employee's file unless an individual employee has sufficient
absences to place him within a more advanced stage of the progressive
discipline structure contained in the Agreement that authorizes a
written warning.
occurrence.

Each employee should be charged with 1/3 of an

The Company acted properly by docking the employees
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for the excess time they had taken for lunch because the employees
were not entitled to be paid for time not worked.

To the extent

that the employees covered by grievance 8544 overextended their
lunch longer than the employees covered by grievance A 9540, they
were properly docked for the longer period of time.
Grievance 8546
The third grievance covers 2 employees who are charged with
falsifying the timesheet and overextending their 30 minute lunch
period to 1 hour and 20 minutes.

Each employee was sent home for

the balance of the shift on July 15, 1979 which the Company subsequently deemed to be a 1/2 day suspension; each employee thereafter received an additional 2 day suspension.
The conduct of the employees covered by grievance 8546
overlaps the actions discussed with respect to the employees
covered by grievance A 9540 and grievance 8544.

To the extent

that the two employees falsified the timesheets, and I find that
they did, the Company acted properly for the reasons I set forth
in the discussion concerning grievance A 9540.

To the extent that

the two employees were sent home for the balance of the shift on
July 15, 1979, I am of the view that the Company acted improperly
for the reasons I set forth in the discussion concerning
8544.

grievance

The warning letters were improper as to the references

concerning lateness but were proper as to the references concerning falsification of the timesheet.
therefore must be deleted.
1/3 of an occurrence.

The objectionable portions

The employees are to be charged with
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The employees covered by grievance 8546 also received an additional two day suspension.

The Company contends that it imposed this

extra discipline because the two employees had previously received
a suspension for similar conduct in February 1977.

The Union

argues that the Agreement bars the Company from relying upon the
previous incident in February 1977 because past discipline is to
be expunged after an employee's record is clear for one year.
The applicable contractual language is contained in Section
31 of the Agreement.

The key sentence provides:

1ISuch

written

disciplinary warnings or reprimands will be expunged from the
employee's personnel records after one (1) year." The plain
language refers to "warnings or reprimands" and does not mention
suspensions.

Had the parties intended to require that a past

suspension be expunged from an employee's personnel record after
an employee's record is clear for one year, they could have so
specified.

In fact, in the sentence that follows the one just

quoted, the Agreement includes the language, "(b)efore discharging
or suspending any employee. . . . "

Thus it is beyond dispute

that the parties knew how to specify in precise language the
various aspects of discipline that they intended to regulate.

I

therefore find that the Company had no obligation to expunge the
February 1977 suspension from the employees' personnel records.
also consider the Company's imposition of a two day suspension
under the circumstances of this case to have been consistent with
the progressive discipline structure contained in the Agreement.
In conclusion, the Company acted improperly in suspending

I
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the employees by sending them home at 1:30 PM.

The employees

are entitled to be made whole for their lost earnings from that
point until the scheduled end of the shift at 3:45 PM.

Each em-

ployee shall be charged with 1/3 of an occurrence for returning
late from lunch.

The Company acted properly in suspending the

employees for two days and in docking them for the excess time
taken for lunch.

The disciplinary

letters shall be conformed to

reflect these changes.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
For the reasons and under the circumstances
set forth in the foregoing Opinion:
Grievance A 9540 is denied.
Grievance 8544 is decided as follows:
(1) the 1/2 day suspensions shall be rescinded
and the employees shall be made whole for their
lost earnings between 1:30 PM and 3:45 PM on
July 15, 1979;
(2) the warning letters shall be rescinded and
removed from each employee's personnel file; and
(3) each employee shall be charged with 1/3 of
an occurrence.
Grievance 8546 is decided as follows:
(1) the 1/2 day suspension shall be rescinded
and the employees shall be made whole for their
lost earnings between 1:30 PM and 3:45 PM on
July 15, 1979;
(2) deleted from the disciplinary letters shall
be the reference to the excess time taken for
lunch on July 15, 1979 and
(3) each employee shall be charged with 1/3 of
an occurrence.
The Company's docking of the pay of all grievants
for the amount of time they were late or extended
their lunch period, is sustained.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: May 22, 1980
STATE OF NEW YORK )e
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)"
On this 22nd day of May, 1980 before me personally came and
appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home
& Allied Health Services Union (Union)

AWARD

and
Sea Crest Health Care Center (Employer)

An agreement dated November 22, 1977 between the Union and
Employer provided in paragraph "3" for certain wage increases effective July 1,
1977, September 1, 1977 and March 1, 1978 and further provided that "the Agreement
shall reopen on March 31, 1978 for discussion on further wage increases.

In the

event the parties are unable to agree, the question shall be submitted before Eric
Schmertz, Esq."

When an impasse in such negotiations developed the matter was

referred to Mr. Schmertz as Arbitrator. The undersigned is designed to hear and
determine the matter and the following stipulated issues:
(a) "What payment, if any, shall employer make forthwith toward its
delinquencies to all funds?"
(b) "How shall any remaining delinquencies to said funds be treated
and/or liquidated?"
Both parties appeared before me with the Employer represented by
Mr. Ernest Dicker and the Union represented by Peter Ottley.
After due consideration and a review of the Agreement and documents submitted by the parties, the Award is as follows:
1. The dates on which the wage increases shall be implemented and
the amount of such increases per week are:

1.

Dec. 1, 1978
*Blue Collar
*LPN
*RN

Schedule A
Oct. 1, 1979

Apr. 1, 1980

Oct. 1, 1980
$10
13

$14

$7

15

9

$9
10

16

10

11

11

*The minimum rates shall be
Dec.
Oct.
Apr.
Oct.

Non Prof. Blue Collar
$204
211
220
230

1, 1978
1, 1979
1, 1980
1, 1980

LPN
262.88
271.88
281.88
292.88

RN
328.54
338.54
349.54
362.54 ,

:

The minimum rates for RN supervisors shall be $5 higher than the
RN's.
The current increase will be paid fifteen (15) days after receipt of
this award by the parties. Retroactive increases will be paid thirty (30) days after
receipt of this award by the parties.
2. Duration. Paragraph 1 shall read "This agreement shall continue in
full force and effect until March 31, 1981. On or before April 1, 1981 the parties
shall commence negotiations for a successor collective bargaining agreement."
3. All other terms of the current Agreement between the parties
shall remain in full force and effect unless modified by provisions of this Award.
The parties further agree that with the changes contained in this
award, the November 22, 1977 Agreement between the parties, shall be extended
through March 31, 1981. If the parties fail to reach settlement of a subsequent
agreement before the expiration of that Agreement, the parties shall submit all
outstanding issues to binding arbitration before Eric Schmertz. However, in the
event the said Arbitrator awards any increases, said increases and effective dates
of said increases shall not be above and beyond those increases contained in the
Master Agreement.

The expiration date of the successor agreement shall be extended for
the identical length of term as the relationship of this agreement to the Master
Agreement between Local IW and the Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association.
In the event the undersigned is unable to serve, it is agreed that
Burton Turkus, Esq. shall be the successor Arbitrator to determine all outstanding
issues between the parties.
4. It is further agreed that with regard to Sea Crest's indebtedness to
the various Funds, and the current confession of judgment, the home shall pay
$105,000 within ten (10) days upon receipt of this award, and it is acknowledged that
Sea Crest has paid $20,000 on January 14, 1980. The balance of said debt shall be
placed in an amortized schedule of $12,500 per month commencing July 1, 1980
through March 1, 1981 with a final balloon payment due March 31, 1981. On or before
March 31, 1981 the Employer may petition the Arbitrator for a forgiveness.
In addition: The home shall execute a new confession of judgment
covering all balances due.

Sea Crest shall make all current payments in

accordance with the terms of Paragraph 4.
Dated:
New York, New York
Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., Arbitrator
STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
)ss:
)

On this
day of
, 1980 before me personally
came Eric J. Schmertz, to me known, and known to me to be the individual
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

3.

P

In the Matter of. the Arbitration

,,

X.
X
X
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home X
& Allied Health Services Union (Union)
X
between

«

AWARD

X

and

X
X
Sea Crest Health Care Center (Employer) X
X
An agreement dated November 22, 1977 between the Union and Employer
provided in paragraph "3" for certain wage increases effective July 1, 1977,
September 1, 1977 and March 1, 1978 and further provided that "the Agreement
shall reopen on March 31, 1978 for discussion on further wage increases.

In

the event the parties are unable to agree, the question^s^e^-be submitted
before Eric Schmertz, Esq."

When an impasse in such negotiations developed

the matter was referred to Mr. Schmertz as Arbitrator.

The undersigned is

designated to hear and determine the matter.
Both parties appeared before me with the Employer represented by Mr
Bart Lawson of the Greater New York Health Care Facilities Association, and
Ernest Dicker, and the Union represented by Peter Ottley.
After due consideration and a review of the Agreement and documents
submitted by the parties the Award is as follows:

1.

• •

The dates on which the wage increases shall be implemented and

the amount of such increases per week are:
Schedule "A
" "

1978
Pec. 1

1979
Oct. 1
$

1980
Apr. 1
$

1980
Oct. 1
$

14

7

9

10

15

9

10

11

16

10

11

13

$

*Blue Collar

*RN

* The minimum rates shall be

LPN

Non Prof. Blue Collar
$

RN

$

r~

Dec. 1, 1978

204

262.88

328.54

Oct. 1, 1979

211

271.88

338.54

Apr. 1, 1980

220

281.88

349.54

Oct. 1, 1980

230

292.88

362.54

I

The minimum rates for RN supervisors shall be $5 higher than the
RN's.
The current increase will be paid fifteen (15) days after receipt of this
award by the parties.

Retroactive increases will be paid thirty ( 3 0 ) days

after 'receipt of this award by the parties.
2.

Duration.

Paragraph 1 shall read "This agreement shall continue

-

->

in full force and effect until^aha*^ 31, 1981/7 On or before April 1, 1981 the
parties shall commence negotiations for a successor collective bargaining agreement."
3.

All other terms of the current Agreement between the parties shall

remain in full force and effect unless modified by provisions of this Award.
The parties further agree that with the changes contained in this award
the November 22, 1977 Agreement between the parties shall be extended through
«&*i&w*31, 1981. I If the parties fail to reach settlement of a subsequent agree-

^ expiration of that Agreement, the parties shall submit all
ment before the
outstanding issues to binding arbitration before Eric Schmertz. However,
in the event the said Arbitrator awards any increases, said increases and
effective dates of said increases shall not be above and beyond those increases
contained in the Master Agreement.
The expiration date of the successor agreement shall be e x t e n d e d for
the identical length of term as the relationship of this agreement to the Master
Agreement between Local 144 and the Greater New York Health Care Facilities
Association.

is agreed that Burton Turkus, Esq. shall be the Arbitrator to
determine all outstanding issues between the parties.
4.

It is further agreed that with regard to Sea Crest's indebtedness to

the various Funds, and the current confession of judgment, the home shall pay
V;

'

$105,000 within ten (10) days upon receipt of this award, and it is acknowledged

?

that Sea Crest has paid $20,000 on January 14, L880.

The balance of said

^^^h^oo^fj^^^tJ^A.

^

J'

debt shall be placed in an amortized schedule! vmh!TlInaI~Eluloon payments^*
'ffesr
1 .

m

fc

•

A

M

In addition:
all balances due.

*v» -. rf5L \*

mS*bk ^

M

'

V—

The home shall execute a new confession of judgment covering
Sea Crest shall make all current payments in accordance

with the £erms of .M.
""""•"5r*iLr

gi^^
'Marcb.^31,^

1981 the^Employer may petition the Arbitrator for a
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In the Matter of the Dispute Between
SHALOM NURSING HOME, NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL,
Employer,

RECOMMENDATIONS OF
MEDIATION PANEL

-andLOCAL 144, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO
Union.

On June 26, 1980, the Shalom Nursing Home and the
National Council of Young Israel (hereinafter the "Employer") and
Local 144, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO (the "Union"), desiring to enter
into mediation and conciliation to resolve a dispute between them
concerning the rights of the Union's members to reinstatement
after a prolonged strike, agreed to meet and confer with a
mediation panel, mutually designated by them, for the purpose of
seeking a resolution of the dispute.
The parties agreed that the following members would
constitute the Mediation Panel:
Morris Aarons
Abraham D. Beame
Louis J. Lefkowitz
Bayard Rustin
Eric J. Schmertz
The Panel designated Mr. Schmertz to serve as its
chairman.
Discussions were held with both parties on June 26,
1980.

Present for the Employer were:

Esq. and Howard Wolfe.

Rabbi Sturm, Roger Gilson,

Present for the Union were Peter Ottley,

Irwin Bluestein, Esq. and Paul Moore, Esq.

Also present as

observers were Louis Levine and Harry Avrutin, and Stephanie
Hill, Esq. who served as secretary to the Panel.
In separate discussions with the Panel, the parties
presented their statements of position and suggestions for
resolving the dispute between them.
The Panel then entered into executive session and
subsequently informed both parties that the Panel would accept
the designation and appointment as mediators, and suggested to
both sides that they authorize the Panel to make nonbiding
recommendations for resolution of the dispute, which would be
given serious consideration for acceptance by the parties.
At the June 26 meeting, the Union accepted the Panel's
suggestion.

The Employer requested that its reply be deferred

to July 17 in order for it to present the Panel's procedural
suggestion to its Board of Directors.
On July 17, 1980 the Employer agreed to the foregoing
procedure, and, pursuant to the Panel's June 26 statement that it
would issue its Recommendation forthwith on July 17th if both
sides agreed to that procedure, the Panel sets forth below and
herewith issues its Recommendations.
Basis of the Dispute
The Union was certified as the collective bargaining
representative for a unit of approximately 140 non-professional,
non-technical employees in July 1979.
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On October 18, 1979, during a period when the parties
were engaged in collective bargaining over the terms of their
first collective agreement, the Union commenced a strike against
the Employer.

The strike is still in progress, although approxi-

mately 44 of the 140 striking employees have returned to work.
Collective bargaining has continued between the parties,
and, with the aid of a mediator appointed by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the parties have reached agreement on
most of the major issues separating them.
However, with respect to the issue of the reinstatement
of striking employees, the parties have been unable to reach
agreement.

It is this issue which the parties have asked the

Panel to consider.
The Panel understands that there are approximately
96 employees who went on strike in October 1979 and who have not
returned to their jobs.

Of this number, the Union believes that

approximately 85 have not obtained permanent employment elsewhere
and desire reinstatement to their original employment with Shalom
Nursing Home; however, there is some question as to the exactness
of these figrues.

Further, of these 85 employees, 13 have been

charged with picket-line misconduct.
The Panel also understands that the Employer has replaced
all of the striking employees, and currently has no vacant job
positions.

Moreover, the Employer anticipates that attrition

will account for approximately only 3 job vacancies in the unit
per month.

Recommendations of the Panel
Having given due consideration to the positions and
suggestions of both parties, the Panel makes the following
recommendations:
1.

The Union shall immediately determine with speci-

ficity the number of employees actively seeking reinstatement
with the Employer.

The Panel recommends that the Union obtain

written verification from each employee who seeks reinstatement.
2.

The Employer shall reinstate all employees who

have indicated in writing their desire to return to their employment with Shalom Nursing Home.

Such reinstatement shall be made

under the following conditions:
(a)

The Employer will not be required to re-

instatement the 13 employees charged with picketline misconduct until such time as an impartial
arbitrator has adjudicated their right to such
reinstatement.
(b)

No later than two weeks following the

rendition of these recommendations of the Mediators, the Employer shall reinstate 25 employees
who have verified their wish to return to work.
(c)

The remaining number of employees who

have verified their wish to be reinstated shall be
reinstated by the Employer at a rate of one-third
of such remaining number every 30 days, so that all
employees shall be returned to their employment no
-4-

later than three months and two weeks following
the date of these recommendations.
(d)

Reinstatement shall be effected on the

basis of seniority (i.e., those with greater seniority shall be reinstated first.)
3.

Upon

the joint request of the parties, the Panel

will assist the parties in the implementation of these recommendations.

If requested, the Panel will also assist in counselling

those present workers who will be displaced by the reinstatement
of the strikers.
Dated:

New York, New York
July 17, 1980

Respectfully submitted,

Erief/3. Schmertz

M o r r i s Aarons

Abraham D. Beame

Louis J. 1,efko

Bayard Rustin
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July 2, 1980
Mr. Eric J. Schmertz
122 East 42 Street
Room 1515
New York, New York 10168
Dear Mr. Schmertz:
Enclosed please find the Report and Recommendations
of the Mediation Panel which I have drafted for your review.
Although I have drafted the Panel's recommendations as
stated during executive session (at pages 3-5 of the enclosed
Report), I wish to call to your attention a problematical
issue raised by the recommendations. In paragraph 2(b)
(page 4), the recommendation of immediate reinstatement of 25
employees is made. While the Panel did not raise the issue,
General Lefkowitz and I believe it might be appropriate to
afford the Employer a two-week period in which to reinstate
these 25 employees in order to provide sufficient notice to
replacements that their employment will be terminated.
Moreover, if such a two-week notice period is extended to the
Employer in paragraph 2(b), then the three-month period for
reinstatement of the balance of striking employees, as
provided in paragraph 2(c), should similarly be extended by
two weeks.
When you have completed your review of the draft and
remit your revisions to me, I will make the necessary changes
and distribute the Report and Recommendations to the other
members of the Panel.

jincerGly yours,
Steph
SH:jaj
Enclosure

Hill

In the Matter of the Dispute Between
SHALOM NURSING HOME, NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL,
RECOMMENDATIONS
OF
MEDIATION PANEL

Employer,
-andLOCAL 144, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO
Union.

On June 26, 1980, the Shalom Nursing Home and the National
Council of Young Israel (hereinafter the "Employer") and Local 144,
S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO (the "Union"), desiring to enter into mediation
CX-«

and conciliation to resolve bhd .primtrry -dispute between them concerning
the rights of the Union's members to reinstatement after a prolonged
strike, agreed to meet and confer with a mediation panel, mutually
designated by them, for the purpose of seeking a resolution of the
dispute.

_

l^w^T
The parties agreed that the following jaember-s
would
the Mediation Panel:
Morris Aarons
Abraham D. Beame
Louis J. Lefkowitz
Bayard Rustin
Eric J. Schmertz
The Panel designated ErJ-C-^hr Schmertz to serve as its
chairman.
flX|:p^:p(a*L Hiscussions were held with both parties on
June 26, 1980.

Present for the Employer were:

Roger Gilson, Esq. and Howard Wolfe.

Rabbi Sturm,

Present for the Union were:

. and Paul Moore, Esq.

Peter Ottleyy—icwi;

jpr^£5/s£it were Louis ]£evine, Harry Avrutin/^fas observers?7\and
Stephanie Hill, Es/g. £as secretary to the ParieT£7~
In separate discussions with the Panel, the parties presented
their statements /of position and suggestions for resolving the dispute
between them.
The/ Panel then entered into executive session and subsequently
X, *w'

it, u|
the. Banel would accept its
m

iff**" U

t\i

*"~^L_JL^—

"~""""

A!

designation and appoin-bnentA.asA.Bie^iators,
•»

\

W~

•*7IJf8

_¥-*•"?

•/f

and Jissufe ^t-nonbinding ±e^0t*M^d'recommendations which w«^5=-tro be
/*

given

.
serious
*^

.

• „ . . . i,.

-

consideratfjbn by the parties.
T^

^i, rf-^i

J

T x -w

Both pa:rbiesyagreed to

A

this procedure and agre"e~cr to give

Basis of the Dispute
The Union
representative

was certified as the collective

bargaining

for a unit of approximately 140 non-professional, non-

technical employees in July 1979.
On October 18, 1979, during a period when the parties
were engaged in collective bargaining over the terms of their
collective agreement, the Union commenced a strike against
Employer.

The strike is still in progress, although^approximately 44

of the 140 striking employees have returnedjfeer'work.

-

Collective bargaining has continued between the parties,
and, with the aid of a mediator appointed by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, the parties have reached agreement on
most of the major issues separating them.
However, with respect to thefytf&fefck.issue of the reinstatement of striking employees, the parties have been unable to reach
agreement.

It is this issue which the parties have asked the Panel

to consider.
The Panel understands that there are approximately 96
employees who went on strike in October 1979 and who have not
returned to their jobs.

Of this number, the Union believes that

approximately 85 have not obtained permanent employment elsewhere
and desire reinstatment to their original employment with Shalqm
Nursing Home; however, there is some question as to the ftga^rooy of
0S%tr~tfr^ts>4

these figures.

Further, of these 85 employees, 13 have been charged

with picket-line misconduct.
The Panel also understands that the Employer has replaced
all of the striking employees, and currently has no vacant job
positions.

Moreover, the Employer anticipates that attrition will

account for approximately only 3 job vacancies in the unit per month.
Recommendations of the Panel
Having given due consideration to the positions and
suggestions of both parties, the Panel makes the following recommendations:
1.

The Union shall maker -a=rr- immediate /e-L&JFTl -fe^ determine

with specificity the number of employees actively seeking reinstatement
with the Employer.

The Panel recommends that the Union obtain written

- 3 -

verification from each employee who seeks reinstatement.
2.

The Employer shall reinstate all employees who have

indicated in writing their desire to return to their employment
with Shalom Nursing Home.

Such reinstatement shall be made unde?

the following conditioi
(a)

JSHfiEr

v, /i/jg^xjajes'i t/^==«^- ^~xcr^--x^"- ~*jf

r*~s

!£he employer will not be required to reinstate
the 13 employees charged with picket-line
misconduct until such time as an impartial
arbitrator has adjudicated their right to
such reinstatement.

(b)

renditiori of this Report -ofthe

<r

Mediators, the Employer shall reinstate 25
(f-e/uJ^u^^ (JUd^U^ (^d*."~ff- "t-<>y£-t-A_ 4~e d&i^rL

employees -to^-th@4-r -employmcrrfc'.
(c)

'•

Upon determinative^--e4-^ the. remaining number
of employees srgg^iuj reinstatement wi^h—%he
'reinstate

n

at a rate of one-third of
such remaining number every 30 days, so
that all employees shall be returned to
their employment no later than 3 months
from the date of this Report,
(d)

Reinstatement shall be effected on the basis
of seniority. / •/• % ,

3.

Upon the joint request of the parties, the Panel will

7^^ £

assist the parties in the implementation of t&o above Recommendations,
If requested, the Panel will also assist^Lha D<i§iitBi¥^r in counselling

- 4 -

the reinstatement of

Dated:

New York, New York
July 17, 1980

Respectfully submitted,

Eric J. Schmertz

Morris Aarons

Abraham D. Beame

Louis J. Lefkowitz

Bayard Rustin
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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
National Union of Hospital and
Health Care Employees, District
1199E, AFL-CIO, RWDSU

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc

The stipulated issue is:
1. Are the grievances arbitrable?
2. If so, did the Hospital violate Section
5.10 of the Agreement as charged by the
Union in the written grievance, when the
Hospital failed to provide the grievants
with one hour of pay for time not worked
on Wednesday, February 21, 1979.
3. If so what shall be the remedy if any,
and to whom does the Award apply?
A hearing was held on November 28, 1979 in Baltimore,
Maryland at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Hospital appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
Initially the Union grieved on behalf of Virginia Clark
and Mary Marcus.

At or up to the Third Step of the grievance

procedure the Union amended and expanded the grievance to include
other unnamed employees allegedly similarly situated to Clark and
Marcus.
On February 21, 1979 a Phase 2 Snow Emergency Plan was in
effect in Baltimore.
to begin work at 7 AM.

Grievants Marcus and Clark were scheduled
They did not live within walking distance
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of the Hospital.

They arrived late and punched in respectively

at 11:17 AM and 11:16 AM.

They both punched out at 3:42 PM and

were paid only for the actual time they worked that day.
On behalf of Clark and Marcus and other unnamed employees
the grievance seeks one hour's pay for the first hour of their
regular shift not worked that day.

The grievance relies on

Section 5.10 of the contract which reads:
Section 5.10 - Snow Emergencies: On any
day that the Baltimore City Transit and
Traffic Division declares that a Phase 2
Snow Emergency Plan is in effect, employees
who do not live within walking distance
of the Hospital shall be allowed a one (1)
hour grace period before they shall be
considered as being late for work.
In addition to disputing the Union's interpretation of the
foregoing contract provision, the Hospital raises a threshold
question of arbitrability.

It claims that all aspects of the

grievance, on behalf of Marcus and Clark, and also as to any other
unnamed grievants are not arbitrable because the steps and conditions of the grievance procedure of the contract (Article 15)
were not followed or met.
On the matter of arbitrability I conclude that the Hospital
is correct with regard to the unknown grievants who were added to
the original grievance at or up to Step 3.
As the parties well know, and as expressed by other
arbitrators serving under this contract, the arbitrator is bound
by the language of the Agreement.

Here the parties negotiated
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mandatory conditions regarding the filing and processing of
grievances.

In significant part Article 15 provides that:

....a grievance under this Agreement....
must be ....processed in accordance with
the following steps, time limits and
conditions. (Underscoring supplied).
Though the Union was within its rights in amending the written
grievance up to and including Step 3, it failed to comply with
other parts of the contract paragraph dealing with any such amendment or modification.

Article 15 Step 1 (b) paragraph 3rd, must

be read in conjunction with the first paragraph of (b), particularly the provision thereof which requires that the grievance
form be signed "by the Grievant and his Delegate...."

Paragraph

3rd, which allows the Union to amend or modify the written
grievance authorizes the Union to file the grievance on behalf
of a Grievant(s).... "in accordance with this procedure" ....
"if a Grievant is unwilling to file a grievance and such failure
will prejudice the rights of other employees."

To my mind this

means that the Union may amend or modify a written grievance, as
in the instant case, by including additional grievants and that
the additional grievants are excused from signing the grievance
on one condition, namely if such grievant(s) "is unwilling to file
a grievance and such failure will prejudice the rights of other
employees."

In the instant case the Union has offered no evidence

to show that the additional and unnamed grievants were unwilling
to file grievances on their own behalf and the failure to do so

-4prejudiced other employees.

Hence the Union and those unnamed

grievants are not excused from the mandatory contractual requirement that those grievants sign the grievance.
Moreover, the mandatory requirement that the grievance be
signed (except in those cases where a grievant is unwilling to
file a grievance and such failure will prejudice the rights of
other employees) is obviously intended to insure that the Hospital
is aware of which employees are making claims so that those claims
can be properly particularized, investigated and dealt with in
the grievance procedure and if necessary, in arbitration.

Under

the instant circumstance, where the additional grievants added by
the Union remain unnamed, where those grievants have not signed
the grievance, where there has been no showing that they were
unwilling to file the grievance and that their failure to do so
would prejudice the rights of other employees, and where the
Hospital remains uninformed as to which employees may be involved
and the particulars of their claims, I must conclude that in the
respects indicated, the Union and those grievants have not complied
with specified, mandatory requirements of the grievance procedure.
Therefore, the grievance as it may apply to those unnamed grievants,
is not arbitrable.
However, with respect

to grievants Marcus and Clark, I

conclude that the requirements of the grievance procedure have
been more than substantially met and that there has been adequate
procedural compliance to satisfy the mandatory requirements of

-5the Agreement.
The Hospital asserts that grievants Marcus and Clark
failed to sign the grievance form; that the grievance was submitted at Step 2 rather than Step 1; that there was no Step 1
meeting with the grievants1 Supervisor; and that because these
conditions which must be followed and met, were not followed and
met the grievance is fatally defective and barred from arbitration
Though the Union delegate filled out the grievance at the
Step 2 location on the form, she submitted it to the grievants'
Supervisor.

What that means is that though the grievance was in

part ministerially inaccurate on its face because the delegate
signed it at the Step 2 location, its submission was procedurally
correct when it was given to the supervisor designated by the
Step 1 procedure.

As long as the grievance reached the managerial

employee responsible for Step 1, I am satisfied that it was
properly filed and that the Hospital had adequate notice at the
Step 1 level, irrespective of where on the grievance forms the
Union delegate placed her name.

That there was no Step 1 meeting

between the supervisor, the grievants and the delegate was as
much the fault of the Hospital as it was the Union and grievants
Marcus and Clark.

Step 1 (b) provides that after the grievance

is presented to the supervisor:
The Supervisor shall discuss it with the
Grievant and his Delegate at a mutually
convenient time.
I interpret that to mean that the supervisor had as much

-6responsibility to schedule a Step 1 meeting as did the Union and
the grievants.

Supervisor Garilich did not schedule such a meet-

ing, nor did she refer the grievances back to the Union for
different processing.

Instead she filled out the "Disposition"

box next to Step 1 by signing her name, by placing the date of
March 22, 1979 (two days after the grievances were submitted to
her by Union delegate Huff), and significantly by writing
"grievance denied."

I construe that to mean that Supervisor

Garilich treated the grievances as having been filed with her in
accordance with the Step 1 requirements, and that she dealt with
the grievances on their merits without having a meeting.

Under

that circumstance I do not think it was unreasonable for the
Union to assume that a Step 1 meeting between the supervisor

the

grievant and the Union delegate had been waived by the Hospital
or was no longer necessary, and that the grievance could be moved
to the next Step.
That grievants Marcus and Clark did not sign the grievance
form at the place
provided in the Step 1 box is not a fatal defect.
'
Obviously the principal purpose for the signature at that location
is to show that an employee has initiated and/or joined in the
complaint in compliance with the contractual requirement that the
grievance be signed by both the grievant and his delegate.

However,

both grievants Marcus and Clark placed their signatures on their
respective grievance forms, not in the Step 1 box but at the top
of the form next to the words GRIEVANT: Name.

That their
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signatures were placed there adequately establishes that they
initiated and joined in the grievance, and those signatures together with the signature of the Union delegate Mary Huff (located
as previously indicated in the Step 2 box) adequately complied
with the Step 1 requirement that the grievance be signed by both
the grievant and his delegate.
For these reasons the grievances as they relate to
employees Marcus and Clark are arbitrable.
On the merits however the grievances are denied.
5.10 of the contract is manifestly ambiguous.

Section

In my view it is

logically susceptible to at least three reasonable but different
interpretations.

One as asserted by the Union, is that the one

hour grace period means that an employee late for work during a
Phase 2 Snow Emergency and who does not live within walking
distance of the Hospital will be paid for the first hour he is
late regardless of when he arrives.

Or in other words he will

receive pay for the actual time worked plus one hour.

Another

interpretation, as advanced by the Hospital, is that because
Section 5.10 is found within the contract Article (Article 5)
dealing with "hours of work", it applies only to an employee's
attendance record and has no bearing on or application to that
employee's pay for the day involved.

Under this interpretation,

as the Hospital argues, the one hour grace period means that for
purposes of attendance and/or potential discipline for tardiness,
an employee will not be considered late if he arrives within one

-8hour of the start of his shift during a Phase 2 Snow Emergency,
provided he does not live within walking distance.

But that he

will receive no pay for time not worked, including the first hour.
A third interpretation is that an employee will be paid for the
first hour of his shift only if he arrives at work within one
hour following the scheduled start of that shift, provided again
that a Phase 2 Snow Emergency is in effect and the employee does
not live within walking distance.
It is well settled that where a disputed contract clause
is ambiguous, its meaning may be gleaned from past practice and
from relevant negotiation history.

Here, where the burden is on

the Union to prove its grievance under Section 5.10 of the contract, what past practice there has been and what evidence there
is about what took place during relevant contract negotiations,
are not supportive of the Union's claim, and hence neither the
Union nor the grievants have met the requisite burden.

The

Hospital introduced evidence showing that the single prior grievance dealing with a similar factual circumstance was denied by the
Hospital in the grievance procedure and was not appealed to
arbitration by the Union.

And that subsequent thereto, at con-

tract negotiations the Union sought contract language expressly
providing for pay for the grace period under Section 5.10 of the
contract; that the Hospital refused to grant it and the Union
withdrew that demand from the negotiations.

Under those circum-

stances if that prior grievance and that cited history of

-9negotiations are not enough to clarify Section 5.10 in support
of the Hospital's position in this case, the Section remains unclear and ambiguous.

There is no practice or negotiation history

cited which would clarify it consistent with the Union's claim.
This conclusion is not overturned by the Union's reliance on how
other hospitals under contracts with this Union administer similar,
but not identical contract language.

Those other contracts involve

different hospitals and were negotiated separately.

They are not

before me and hence are neither precedential to nor determinative
of the instant grievance between the Union and this Hospital.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
1. The grievances of Virginia Clark and
Mary Marcus are arbitrable.
2. The grievances of other unnamed employees
claimed to be similarly situated are not
arbitrable.
3. The Hospital did not violate Section 5.10
of the Agreement, as charged by the Union
in the written grievance, when the Hospital
failed to provide grievants Clark and Marcus
with one hour of pay for time not worked on
Wednesday, February 21, 1979.

DATED: March 12, 1980
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twelfth day of March, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Bureau of District Office
Operations, Social Security
Administration - New York Region

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 80K/06125

and
New York-New Jersey Council of
District Office Locals
American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO

The stipulated issue is:
Did management violate Article XXIII,
Section 2, by denying administrative
leave to Michael Calderon on June 22,
1979 and June 26, 1979? If so, what is
the appropriate remedy?
A hearing was held on October 15, 1980 at which time Mr.
Calderon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Employer and Union appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
During the gasoline shortage crisis in the spring and summer
of 1979, when the grievant used his automobile to travel to and
from work, he was late for work four hours on June 22nd and two
hours on June 26th, 1979 because he was delayed in gas lines.
He sought but was denied administrative leave for the six hours
involved.

Instead that time was charged to or against his annual

leave.
Article XXIII Section 2 reads:

-2During a snow emergency, gasoline shortage, or interruption in transportation
facilities, services, or road travel, the
affected employees will be granted reasonable administrative leave to cover the
situation in accordance with applicable
rules and regulations.
There is no dispute about the gasoline shortage crisis at
the time, nor does the Employer question the grievant's delays
due to time spent on gasoline lines on the two days in question.
The Employer denied the grievant's request for administrative
leave because it determined his tardiness to be "unjustified."
It is the Employer's contention that the grievant should have
obtained gasoline for his car on weekends or during non-working
hours, or that during the gasoline crisis he should have used
available public transportation to come to work.

The Employer

points out that under the aforesaid contract clause, administrative
leave for "gasoline shortage" will be granted "in accordance with
applicable rules and regulations."

It is the Employer's conten-

tion that the applicable rules and regulations which accord
management the right to determine whether an absence or tardiness
is justified, permits the Employer to require an employee to use
public transportation or to obtain gasoline for his car at times
which would not interfere with his working hours during gasoline
shortage crises.

That the grievant did not do so, the Employer

argues, was not consistent with the agency rules

and regulations,

and hence his tardiness was not justified for the purpose of
receiving administrative leave.
I do not read the aforesaid contract provisions that way.

It

is undisputed that that contract provision was negotiated subse-

-3-

quent to the rules and regulations relied on by the Employer.
The promulgated rules and regulations are general^ In various
forms they say the same thing, namely that absences and tardiness
may be excused "for reasons justifiable to the supervisor."
Prior to the events involved in this case and before the enactment of the foregoing contract clause, the Employer promulgated
no rule or regulation which specifically dealt with absences or
tardiness due to gasoline shortages, nor did it issue any procedures as to how a gasoline shortage would be dealt with if it
affected attendance.
A fundamental contract principle is that the specific takes
precedent over the general.

I consider the foregoing contract

clause to be a specific reference to disruptions in normal attendance due to a gasoline shortage.

That it was negotiated subse-

quent to the general rules and regulations regarding excused
absences and tardiness means, to my mind, that the reference
therein to "applicable rules and regulations" applies to specific
rules and regulations which the Employer could and presumably
would promulgate subsequently, to let the employees know the
circumstances under which administrative leave would be granted
when there was a gasoline shortage.

Indeed, any other interpre-

tation would render Article XXIII Section 2 meaningless.

For if

the reference to "applicable rules and regulations" meant that
the Employer could deny administrative leave for tardiness due
to the gasoline shortage if the affected employee could have
taken public transportation or should have obtained gasoline

-4during off hours, Article XXIII Section 2 would be of no benefit
to employees in the metropolitan New York area.

Here there is

public transportation to virtually every point, and the requirement that gasoline be sought during off hours would mean that a
gasoline shortage could never be a basis for lateness to work.
In short the conditions which the Employer imposed on the
grievant in this case would have the effect of nullifying any
rights to administrative leave under the foregoing contract clause
and would mean that the contract clause was negotiated for no
reason at all, at least for employees in the New York area. I do
not believe that the Union demanded and accepted a contract clause
that could be so restricted or nullified
In my view, Article XXIII Section 2 specifies certain situations, including a gasoline shortage, which would presumptively
create a justifiable absence or tardiness, subject to agency
rules and regulations enacted and promulgated to deal with those
specific situations. Subsequent to the negotiations of the foregoing contract section the Employer did not enact or issue any
rule or regulation specifically dealing with absences or tardiness due to a gasoline shortage.

The Employer issued various

memoranda to its executive and supervisory personnel about how
absences and latenesses due to a gasoline shortage should be
handled.

But those communications were internal to the Employer,

never communicated to the Union or the employees, and hence did
not rise to the level of an "applicable rule or regulation."
Neither the Union or the employee were put on notice that during

-5-

a gasoline shortage they would be required to take public transportation or, if they used their cars, obtain gasoline at times
that would not interfere with their regular working hours.

This

is not to say that any such rule or regulation, if properly
promulgated would be proper under the foregoing contract clause.
That is a question which may have to be determined at another time
in a different proceeding.

Rather it is to say that in the

absence of an explicit rule or regulation dealing with the specifically negotiated conditions of Article XXIII Section 2, the
Employer may not unilaterally impose restrictions which were not
part of its rules and regulations when that contract section was
negotiated, especially when that section enumerated justifiable
reasons for an absence or tardiness for which administrative
leave would obtain.

Indeed, the evidence of the history of the

negotiations of the critical contract clause persuades me that
it was bilaterally agreed to, following a similar but earlier
gasoline shortage, to cover precisely the situation involved in
the instant case.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Management violated Article XXIII
Section 2 of the contract by denying administrative leave to Michael
Calderon on June 22 and June 26, 1979.
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He shall be granted administrative
leave for the time he was late on
those days, and that time shall not
be charged to or against his annual
leave.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 21, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
On this 21st day of November, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Bureau of District Office
Operations, Social Security
Administration - New York Region

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 80K/06125

and
New York-New Jersey Council of
District Office Locals
American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO

The stipulated issue is:
Did management violate Article XXIII,
Section 2, by denying administrative
leave to Michael Calderon on June 22,
1979 and June 26, 1979? If so, what is
the appropriate remedy?
A hearing was held on October 15, 1980 at which time Mr.
Calderon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and repreJ!
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Article XXIII Section 2 reads,:

-2During a snow emergency, gasoline shortage, or interruption in transportation
facilities, services, or road travel, the
affected employees will be granted reasonable administrative leave to cover the
situation in accordance with applicable
rules and regulations.
There is no dispute about the gasoline shortage crisis at
.the time, nor does the Employer question the grievant's delays
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due to time spent on gasoline lines on the two days in question.
The Employer denied the grievant's request for administrative
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leave because it determined his tardiness to be "unjustified."
It is the Employer's contention that the grievant should have
I

obtained gasoline for his car on weekends or during non-working
i

hours, or that during the gasoline crisis he should have used
available public transportation to come to work.

The Employer

points out that under the aforesaid contract clause, administrative
leave for "gasoline shortage" will be granted "in accordance with
applicable rules and regulations."

It is the Employer's conten-

tion that the applicable rules and regulations which accord
management the right to determine whether an absence or tardiness j
is justified, permits the Employer to require an employee to use
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public transportation or to obtain gasoline for his car at times
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which would not interfere with his working hours during gasoline
shortage crises.
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That the grievant did not do so, the Employer
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argues, was not consistent with the agency rules and regulations,
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and hence his tardiness was not justified for the purpose of
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receiving administrative leave.
I do not read the aforesaid contract provisions that way.

It
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is undisputed that that contract provision was negotiated subse- (

-3quent to the rules and regulations relied on by the Employer.
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The promulgated rules and regulations are general,, In various
forms they say the same thing, namely that absences and tardiness
i

may be excused "for reasons justifiable to the supervisor."
Prior to the events involved in this case and before the enactment of the foregoing contract clause, the Employer promulgated
no rule or regulation which specifically dealt with absences or
tardiness due to gasoline shortages, nor did it issue any procedures as to how a gasoline shortage would be dealt with if it
.
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affected attendance.
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A fundamental contract principle is that the specific takes
precedent over the general.

•

I consider the foregoing contract

clause to be a specific reference to disruptions in normal attendance due to a gasoline shortage.

That it was negotiated subse-

quent to the general rules and regulations regarding excused
absences and tardiness means, to my mind, that the reference
therein to "applicable rules and regulations" applies to specific^
rules and regulations which the Employer could and presumably
would promulgate subsequently, to let the employees know the
circumstances under which administrative leave would be granted
when there was a gasoline shortage.
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Indeed, any other interpre- ,

tation would render Article XXIII Section 2 meaningless.

For if

the reference to "applicable rules and regulations" meant that
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the Employer could deny administrative leave for tardiness due
to the gasoline shortage if the affected employee could have
taken public transportation or should have obtained gasoline
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-4during off hours, Article XXIII Section 2 would be of no benefit
to employees in the metropolitan New York area.

Here there is
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public transportation to virtually every point, and the require- i
ment that gasoline be sought during off hours would mean that a
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gasoline shortage could never be a basis for lateness to work.
In short the conditions which the Employer imposed on the
i

grievant in this case would have the effect of nullifying any
rights to administrative leave under the foregoing contract clause
i
and would mean that the contract clause was negotiated for no
i
reason at all, at least for employees in the New York area. I do
not believe that the Union demanded and accepted a contract clause
that could be so restricted or nullified
In my view, Article XXIII Section 2 specifies certainsituj

ations, including a gasoline shortage, which would presumptively
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create a justifiable absence or tardiness, subject to agency
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rules and regulations enacted and promulgated to deal with those
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specific situations. Subsequent to the negotiations of the fore-
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going contract section the Employer did not enact or issue any
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rule or regulation specifically dealing with absences or tardi- i
i
ness due to a gasoline shortage. The Employer issued various
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memoranda to its executive and supervisory personnel about how
I

absences and latenesses due to a gasoline shortage should be
handled.

But those communications were internal to the Employer,

never communicated to the Union or the employees, and hence did
not rise to the level of an "applicable rule or regulation."
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Neither the Union or the employee were put on notice that during j

-5a gasoline shortage they would be required to take public transportation or, if they used their cars, obtain gasoline at times

ii
that would not interfere with their regular working hours.

This

l

is not to say that any such rule or regulation, if properly
promulgated would be proper under the foregoing contract clause. :
That is a question which may have to be determined at another time
in a different proceeding.

Rather it is to say that in the
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absence of an explicit rule or regulation dealing with the specifically negotiated conditions of Article XXIII Section 2, the
Employer may not unilaterally

impose restrictions which were not

i
part of its rules and regulations when that contract section was
negotiated, especially when that section enumerated justifiable
reasons for an absence or tardiness for which administrative
leave would obtain.

Indeed, the evidence of the history of the

negotiations of the critical contract clause persuades me that
it was bilaterally agreed to, following a similar but earlier
gasoline shortage, to cover precisely the situation involved'in
the instant case.
For the foregoing reasons the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations'
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
Management violated Article XXIII
Section 2 of the contract by denying administrative leave to Michael
Calderon on June 22 and June 26, 1979.

i

-6-

He shall be granted administrative
leave for the time he was late on
those days, and that time shall not
be charged to or against his annual
leave.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arb/Ltrator
DATED: November 21, 1980
STATE OF New York ),ss
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 21st day of November, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

o. 60-6099400
Qualified in Westchester County
iss.on Expires March 30

